Live to Win Another Day: Why Many Militant Organizations Survive Yet Few Succeed

Militant organizations pursue two common aims: to survive and to achieve the goals that define their raison d’être. Yet, elements that sustain the life spans of militant organizations are not necessarily the same components that advance the accomplishment of their core, or “outcome,” goals. Further, some organizational practices, such as the use of suicide attacks, generate a tradeoff that bolsters survivability while detracting from the effective pursuit of outcome goals. This study demonstrates that three operating conditions explain variation in the duration and achievement of contemporary militant organizations: receptiveness to tradeoffs, levels of external support, and the nature of adversaries. As such, the unique effects of different operating conditions reveal why many militant organizations survive for long periods of time but only a few achieve the goals that justify their existence.     

Why do street-level bureaucrats risk themselves for others? The case of Israeli police officers

What factors influence police officers’ willingness to risk themselves for others? Police officers are street-level bureaucrats, who are not only given the mandate to use deadly force in order to keep public order but also risk their most important resource – their lives – to protect society. We suggest three factors that prompt police officers to risk their lives: individual characteristics (a desire to gain respect and recognition, and testing one's courage, ideology, and personality), organizational conditions (expectations of peers and supervisors, promotion opportunities), and environmental context (a hostile working environment and the importance of public opinion to them). Using an abductive approach combined with a triangulated qualitative method, our findings indicate that personal characteristics are indeed important, but so too are organizational conditions and environmental context. The practical insight, therefore, is that decision makers ‘can’, in various formal and informal ways, influence street-level bureaucrats’ behaviour. Here, the interactions among managers, workers, and clients are a crucial element.     

Discourses on countering violent extremism: the strategic interplay between fear and security after 9/11

This article explores the construction of extremism in media discourse, the factors driving specific constructions and the implications of these constructions for counterterrorism policy. We contend that extremism has predominantly and increasingly been framed as a security issue. This article explores the implications of this practice through the framework of securitisation. We measure the average intensity of security framing in 38,616 articles found in three major US newspapers, New York Times, Wall Street Journal and Los Angeles Times, between 20 January 1993 and 19 January 2017 comprising the Clinton, Bush and Obama presidencies, and look at factors influencing the shift in intensity over time. Through our analysis, we show that it is possible to return to a pre-9/11 discourse but that the confluence of real-world events and the strategic choices of political actors have so far prevented this from fully occurring. We then explore the effect of securitisation on public perceptions of the threat from terrorism, finding that increases in the intensity of security framing artificially increases the public’s worry about becoming a victim of terrorism. We conclude by discussing implications for the communication of counterterrorism policy and the requirements for an after, after 9/11 approach     

South Asian nuclear arms competition: An American perspective∗

The analysis of nuclear arms competition in South Asia forms part of a much larger study of American relations with the region after the Cold War carried out under the auspices of The Asia Society. The nuclear policies of both India and Pakistan enjoy strong domestic political support. While a case can be made that a rudimentary state of nuclear deterrence exists between New Delhi and Islamabad, this may be undermined by deployment on both sides of ballistic missiles.