Reducing Crime Through Environmental Design: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment of Street Lighting in New York City

Journal of Quantitative Criminology - This paper offers novel experimental evidence that violent crimes can be successfully reduced by changing the situational environment that potential victims...     

SARSCOV-19 amidst corruption: Does the civil society matter? – An empirical study

The pandemic outbreak has dealt consequences on global engagements and structures. With the ongoing search for pandemic-mitigating measures and the excesses (notably corruption) erupted in its wake, concerns have been raised about the decline in public trust, transparency and satisfaction – particularly in Ghana. This situation has spurred multilevel governance discussions regarding pandemic management. Ensuingly characterising policy makers' propositions in this regard is the civil society's salience as a control valve to governance deficits like corruption. Therefore, transcending the anecdotal claims on civil society's efficacy, this study takes a state-society perspective to probe its relevance in fostering trust, transparency and satisfaction, relative to corruption-stricken pandemic governance. The current study engages the general systems theory as a conceptual lens. The structural equation modelling technique was used in analysing data (n = 519) gathered through the questionnaire survey approach. Though results of data analysis affirmed the negative effects of corruption on trust, transparency and satisfaction, the civil society received affirmation as an enhancer of trust, transparency and satisfaction. In view of these study findings, implications and future research suggestions are delimited.     

Prosecutorial regulation in the Global South: Environmental civil litigation by prosecutors in China compared to Brazil

Brazil's successful prosecutorial civil action against polluters could be a regulatory example for the Global South. This paper analyses whether such regulation could also develop without the major political, institutional, and legal reforms that spurred it in Brazil. To do so, it analyzes China, where similar reforms have so far not occurred, but where prosecutors have recently started to initiate civil litigation against polluters. It finds that prosecutorial civil litigation in China has only a limited regulatory effect or potential. Prosecutors in China are influenced by conflicting incentive structures that reward one‐off lower level test cases with an innovation bonus, while structurally stimulating a focus on general crime fighting. Ironically, as a result of such incentives, the recent legal reform, toward providing standing for prosecutors in public interest litigation, will, in contrast to Brazil, decrease rather than increase the regulatory effect of these cases. These findings have implications for understanding how the interaction between regulatory independence, legal reform, and regime type shapes possibilities for regulatory innovation in the Global South.