Prof. W. E. Butler (ed.). Russian Law: Historical and Political Perspectives. Leyden: A. W. Sijthoff, 1977, xi + 266 pp. Dfl. 76.00. $31.50
Peter H. Solomon, Jr., Soviet Criminologists and Criminal Policy. Specialists in Policy‐Making. London: Macmillan Press, 1978. x + 253 pp. £10.00.
Mawdsley, E. The Russian Revolution and the Baltic Fleet. War and Politics, February 1917—April 1918. London: Macmillan (in association with the School of Slavonic and East European Studies), 1978. xv + 213 pp., ill., map, bibl.
George Garvey, Money, Financial Flows and Credit in the Soviet Union. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977 (published for the National Bureau of Economic Research Inc.). xii + 223 pp. £11.00.
Stanislaw J. Sawicki, Soviet Land and Housing Law, a Historical and Comparative Study, New York, London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. xxiii + 199 pp. £13.05.
Hélène Carrère d'Encausse: L'empire éclaté. Paris: Flammarion, 1978, 314 pp.
S. G. Solomon, The Soviet agrarian debate, a controversy in social science, 1923–1929. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1977. xvi + 309 pp. $15.25.
David Lane and Felicity O'Dell, The Soviet Industrial Worker: Social Class, Education and Control. Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1978. 167 pp. £7.95. 相似文献
We consider the degree of ideological polarizationwithin and between the parties in the U.S. House ofRepresentatives for the period 1963–1996, using theGroseclose, Levitt and Snyder (1996) adjustment method for ADA and ACU scores to ensure over timecomparability of roll call voting data. We focusespecially on the median House member, since webelieve that change in the median offers a bettermeasure of the impact of the change in party controlthan does changes in the mean roll-call votingscore. Our data analysis makes two general points. First andforemost, when we looked at the change in the locationof the House median voter, we found a dramatic changeafter the Republicans gained a majority in the House in1994. After the Republicans became a majority in theHouse, the ADA median in the House in 1995–1996 was at24, far closer to the Republican median of 4 than tothe Democratic median of 83. The shift in medianfrom 1993–1994 to 1994–1995 involved a change of over 25points in one election – far and away the greatestsingle shift in ideology of the modern era. Incontrast, the mean changed only 1 point overthis same period. Second, for the three decades weinvestigated, we found three historical epochs vis a visthe relative locations of the ADA (or ACU) floormedian and the ADA (or ACU) floor mean in the U.S.House of Representatives – two inflection points in1983 and 1994 which are related to trends in regionalrealignment. 相似文献
In the standard Downsian model, voters are assumed to choose parties based on the extent of ideological proximity between the voter's own position and that of the party. Yet it is also well known that there are rationalization and projection effects such that voters tend to misestimate the policy platforms of candidates or parties to which they are sympathetic by overstating the correspondence between those positions and the voter's own preferences (see, e.g., Markus & Converse 1979; Granberg & Brent 1980; Granberg & Holmberg 1988; Merrill & Grofman 1999). Here we follow insights in the psychological literature on persuasion (Sherif & Hovland 1961; Parducci & Marshall 1962) by distinguishing between assimilation and contrast effects. Assimilation refers to shortening the perceived ideological distance between oneself and parties one favors; contrast refers to exaggerating the distance to parties for which one does not intend to vote. Using survey data on voter self–placements and party placements on ideological scales for the seven major Norwegian parties, five major French parties, and two major American parties we show that both assimilation and contrast effects are present in each country to a considerable degree.We also investigate the possible effects of randomness in party placement and scale interpretation – effects that can easily be confounded with assimilation but not so easily with contrast. 相似文献
Basic Downsian theory predicts candidate convergence toward the views of the median voter in two-candidate elections. Common journalistic wisdom, moreover, leads us to expect these centripetal pressures to be strongest when elections are expected to be close. Yet, the available evidence from the US Congress disconfirms this prediction. To explain this counterintuitive result, we develop a spatial model that allows us to understand the complex interactions of political competition, partisan loyalties, and incentives for voter turnout that can lead office-seeking candidates, especially candidates in close elections, to emphasize policy appeals to their voter base rather than courting the median voter. 相似文献
Brams and Kilgour (Public Choice 170:99–113, 2017) begin their recent essay on the Electoral College (EC) by pointing out the obvious, but nonetheless regularly neglected fact that noncompetitive states may have a decisive impact on EC outcomes and shape the electoral strategies of the candidates in the competitive states, especially if there is asymmetry in the partisan balances in the non-competitive states. Their contribution is to offer combinatorics insights into the implications of such asymmetries in the form of three new indicators: Winningness, Vulnerability, and Fragility. They then explore the magnitude and effects of these three measures for the presidential elections of 2000, 2004, 2008 and 2012. The major contribution of this note is to extend their analyses of these measures to an additional 34 elections: every election in the modern two-party post-Civil War era from 1868 to 2016. We find the Winningness measure to predict very well over the entire set of 38 presidential elections. Inspired by their work, we also offer a new and simpler metric for partisan asymmetries in noncompetitive states and show how it can predict the expected closeness of EC outcomes as well or better than the more complex combinatorics measures they propose. 相似文献
We look at ways of classifying runoff methods in terms of characteristics such as number of rounds, rules used to determine which candidates advance to the next round, and rules which determine the final winner. We also compare runoffs and so-called instant runoffs such as the alternative vote. 相似文献