健康促进学校活动简介

健康促进学校起源于健康促进活动,是由世界卫生组织发起、许多国家积极响应的一场国际运动。健康促进学校是一所有着系统的政策、程序、活动和结构,旨在保护和促进学生、职员和更广泛学校社区成员健康与幸福的学校。     

The Supply of University Enrollments: University Administrators as Utility Maximizing Bureaucrats

The supply of enrollments in higher education has receivedrelatively little attention in both theoretical and empiricaleconomic research. To address this, we formulate and test amodel of the supply of enrollments in higher education inwhich administrators are modeled as utility maximizingbureaucrats. We find evidence that individual presidents andprovosts have a significant effect on enrollment supply andfaculty demand in a panel of eleven public colleges anduniversities in Maryland from 1988 to 1996, implying thatinstitutions have enough market power to permit thepreferences of administrators to influence enrollment supplyand faculty demand.     

Optimal Government Budgeting Contingency Reserve Funds

During recent years, more state and local governments have made provisions in their budgets for establishing and maintaining contingency reserve funds. A recent study by the National Conference of State Legislatures(NCSL) found that over half of all states now have such funds. The basic purpose of these contingency reserve funds, also referred to as "rainy day" funds, is to insulate governmental budgets from unexpected fiscal disruptions brought about by such factors as unanticipated revenue shortfalls and expenditure overruns. What have received less attention, however, are the criteria which governments need to use in deciding whether to establish such contingency reserves in the first place, and if so, how large these reserves should optimally be. This article explores these two issues, using the State of California as an illustrative case study     

Bundled Discounts, Leverage Theory, and Downstream Competition

Under plausible circumstances, a monopolist in one market canuse its control of prices in that market to force competingdownstream buyers to sign tying contracts that will lever itsmonopoly into another market. Specifically, the monopolist ofthe tying good can place each downstream buyer in a prisoner'sdilemma by offering them more favorable pricing on the tyinggood if they sign a requirements-tying contract covering thetied good. Since a buyer benefits on receiving more favorablepricing on the tying good and the competitors do not, and suffersif the competitors receive more favorable pricing on the tyinggood and the buyer does not, buyers will sign the tying contracteven when they would earn higher profits if they all refusedto sign. This enables a monopolist in one market to inefficientlyexclude an entrant in another market.