An experimental study of the efficiency of unanimity rule and majority rule

Scholars traditionally claim that unanimity rule is more capable of producing Pareto optimal outcomes than majority rule. Dougherty and Edward (Public Choice 151(3):655–678, 2012) make the opposite claim assuming proposals are either random, sincere, or strategic. We test these competing hypotheses in a two-dimensional framework using laboratory experiments. Our primary results suggest: (1) majority rule enters the Pareto set more quickly than unanimity rule, (2) majority rule leaves the Pareto set at the same rate as unanimity rule, and (3) majority rule is more likely to select a Pareto optimal outcome than unanimity rule at the end of the game.     

Risk Attitudes and the Incumbency Advantage

Explanations for the incumbency advantage in American elections have typically pointed to the institutional advantages that incumbents enjoy over challengers but overlook the role of individual traits that reinforce this bias. The institutional advantages enjoyed by incumbents give voters more certainty about who incumbents are and what they might do when (and if) they assume office. We argue that these institutional advantages make incumbents particularly attractive to risk-averse individuals, who shy away from uncertainty and embrace choices that provide more certainty. Using data from 2008 and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Election Study, we show that citizens who are more risk averse are more likely to support incumbent candidates, while citizens who are more risk accepting are more likely to vote for challengers. The foundations of the incumbency advantage, we find, lie not only in the institutional perks of office but also in the individual minds of voters.     

More on Measuring Two-Party Competition: A Response to Dunleavy

Gaines and Taagepera [(2013) How to operationalize two-partyness. Journal of Elections Public Opinion and Parties, 23(4), pp. 387–404] propose two indices of two-party competition for district-level data, both of which are alleged to be flawed. The case against them rests mainly on whether or not elections with one dominant party should be regarded as exhibiting one- or two-way competition. For those inclined to see 90–10% and 50–50% outcomes are different in kind, our indices can provide better measures than the popular effective number of parties or the “gap”. We agree that assessment of a set of outcomes, in a given election or over time, requires careful attention to the important distinction between micro-level data and aggregate measures.     

The Guardian and Press Reform: a Wheel Come Full Circle

In the decade 2008–18, between the eruption of the phone hacking scandal and the cancellation of part two of the Leveson Inquiry, the editorial position of The Guardian on press regulation went from indifference to demanding wholesale reform, and then back to indifference and even active opposition to change. Inevitably, this entailed reversals and contradictions, yet these were not acknowledged to the newspaper’s readers, who are left with a misleading impression of continuity. This study, by an academic and journalist who campaigned for regulatory reform throughout this period, aims to shed light on The Guardian’s 360‐degree progression by reference to its editorials and other published statements.     

Mind the Gap: Attitudes about Miranda Warnings among Police Chiefs and Citizens

Research shows that the police subculture can be characterized by a distinct set of values and beliefs. Much of the police subculture research has focused on common characteristics and values found among a sample of police officers. Fewer studies have considered how the police, as a group, are similar to citizens. In this study, attention is given to similarities and differences in how the police and the public perceive the Miranda warnings. Attention is also given to whether type of neighborhood (low crime versus high crime) is related to attitudes about the Miranda warnings. Findings suggest that while the warnings are perceived in different ways there are similarities that could bridge the gap between the police and public. Implications are suggested.     

International NGOs and the challenge of modernity

The forces associated with economic globalisation and the apparent supremacy of market forces have unleashed a range of political and social processes that have served, and were indeed designed, to enrich and empower the few at the expense of the majority. These include phenomena such as the rise in armed conflict, threats to food security, the loss of livelihoods and traditional ways of life of millions of people worldwide, the commodification of social provision, assaults on national sovereignty, and the privatisation of citizenship. However, the author argues, the most significant impact of globalisation is the 'localisation' of social and political struggle, and the emergence of new forms of international solidarity. Many NGOs have too readily succumbed to the view that globalisation in its present form is inevitable and irreversible, and have accommodated to it by trading their essential values for technical professionalism, often imported from the private sector. However, if NGOs are to assume their place as part of a transformational movement for social justice, they must rediscover and foster the values of citizen participation and develop a genuine respect for diversity.     

Justice Without Transition: Truth Commissions in the Context of Repressive Rule

While the study of transitional justice, and especially truth commissions, has gained in popularity over the past two decades, the literature is overwhelmingly focused on activities in democratizing states. This introduces a selection bias that interferes with proper analysis of causes and consequences of transitional justice on a global scale. In this paper, I discuss conditions under which new repressive elites, and even old repressive elites who survive to rule and repress in nominally new systems, may choose to launch broad investigations of the past. I argue that such a decision is based on two primary considerations, the presence of internally or externally based incentives (e.g., foreign aid) and the level of political control enjoyed by old elites in the new system. I apply this argument to post-Soviet Central Asia, including a detailed case study of Uzbekistan’s 1999 truth commission based on domestic media analysis and local elite interviews.