Everyone likes a winner: An empirical test of the effect of electoral closeness on turnout in a context of expressive voting

Under instrumental voting closer elections are expected to have higher turnout. Under expressive voting, however, turnout may increase with decreasing closeness when voters have a preference for winners. An empirical test using data on Belgian municipal elections supports this. We find that turnout reaches a local maximum when the largest party in the election obtains just over 52% of the seats and then falls (supporting the “instrumental” closeness-argument). There is, however, another turning point: the presence of a highly dominating party (receiving at least two-thirds of the votes) stimulates turnout despite the fact that dominance implies lower closeness.     

What Patent Data Reveal about Universities: The Case of Belgium

In recent years, there has been a surge in patenting by Belgian universities. It appears that this increase can be attributed to growth of biotechnology, where there is a greater propensity to patent, to a desire on the part of universities to enhance commercialization through technology transfer offices (TTOs), and to effective collaboration between universities and government-sponsored research centers. Our qualitative analysis reveals that patent statistics could be a misleading indicator of an individual university's technological productivity, since many inventions are developed at universities, yet applied by other institutions.     

The Prosecution Role where Courts Decide Cases

This article explores the role played by prosecutors during the court stage of criminal proceedings. It complements Peter et al.’s chapter on negotiated case settlements in showing how the power to decide cases is divided between judges and prosecutors when cases are taken to court. Providing information as to, e.g. what influence prosecutors in the 11 study countries have on what evidence is brought to court in “normal” and accelerated court proceedings, this chapter explores the balance of responsibilities in court rooms across Europe.     

Crime Trends in the EU

The paper’s aim is to show to EU policy makers, academics, journalists and the general public what the available information tells us about crime levels, trends in crime and public opinion about crime among Member States. The paper centres on an analysis of current trends on crime levels and trends based on the data available both from victimisation surveys and police statistics. The victimisation survey source is the published data collected in the International Crime Victimisation Survey. A separate analysis based on the Eurobarometer was also carried out. Data on police statistics present two separate sources i.e. the Council of Europe Sourcebook and the crime data published annually by the UK Home Office. These two sources both add considerable value to the raw police statistics by their choice of data, their commentary and their technical explanations and definitions. The paper compares data on three crime types (robbery, domestic burglary and theft of a motor vehicle) across the 15 Member States of the European Union (as in 2003). These three types were selected in line with the priorities of the EU Commission and as types of crime that are a major concern for EU-citizens. The paper has been modified from a report produced by the European Crime prevention network for the EU Directorate of Justice and Home Affairs with the permission of the EU. The members of the network are listed in the appendix.     

Monopoly rights in the privatization of telephone firms

Data from utility privatization sales in 74 countries is analyzed to investigate why governments award monopoly rights, and how monopoly affects government revenue from these sales. Financially constrained governments are more likely to award monopoly rights. Interest groups and institutions are important. Increased importance of taxed business users reduces the probability of a government granting monopoly rights, while an increase in the importance of subsidized residential users has the opposite effect. Durable democracies and market-oriented governments are less likely to award monopoly rights. Monopolies increase government revenue by 66 percent.     

How powerful are public bureaucrats as voters?

Empirical evidence is collected and discussed regarding the influence of public bureaucrats on government sector outcome in their capacity as consumer-voters. It is necessary to isolate the specific effect of working in the public sector (compared to other occupations) on voting participation and on the probability to support an increase in the public budget. For a balanced evaluation of public bureaucrats' power, other forms of their influencing the government sector outcome need to be taken into account.