Power Sharing and Inclusive Politics in Africa's Uncertain Democracies

Power‐sharing agreements have been widely used in Africa as paths out of civil war. However, the research focus on conflict mitigation provides an inadequate guide to recent cases such as Kenya and Zimbabwe. When used in response to flawed elections, pacts guaranteeing political inclusion adversely affect government performance and democratization. Political inclusion in these cases undermines vertical relationships of accountability, increases budgetary spending, and creates conditions for policy gridlock. Analysis using three salient dimensions highlights these negative effects: Origin distinguishes extra‐constitutional pacts from coalitions produced by more stable institutions, function contrasts postwar cases from scenarios where the state itself faces less risk, and time horizon refers to dilemmas that weigh long‐term costs versus short‐term benefits. The conclusion suggests that the drawbacks of inclusive institutions can be moderated by options such as sunset clauses, evenhanded prosecution of human rights violations, and by strengthening checks on executive authority.     

Aggressive Patrol: A Search for Side-effects

Recent interest in the possible deterrent effects of aggressive or proactive policing raises the issue of such strategies' consequences for individual liberties and police-community relations. This study examines the latter—specifically, the effects of four neighborhood-level measures of an aggressive patrol style on citizens' evaluations of police and citizens' propensities to report crimes. The results suggest that, for most citizens, aggressive patrol has almost no effect on either evaluations or reporting behavior. Surprisingly, one form of proactive patrol, the neighborhood rate of suspicion stops, seems to have a positive effect on the evaluations of police made by young black men.     

The Future of Four Wheels: Government and the Automobile Industry in France and West Germany, 1971–1985

The concept of a "policy community" is useful in understanding the joint efforts of national governments and domestic business interests to secure industrial competitiveness in world markets. The definitional debate accompanying the increased use of the term in political studies, on the other hand, is of marginal value in appreciating the substance of government-industry collaboration. An analytic account of the actions of two national governments grappling with the needs of industries subject to similar circumstance, as in a sectoral crisis, provides the opportunity to apply the term in a practical manner. Policy communities are no more than the institutionalized expressions of long-established relationships between private and public interests, subject to national idiosyncracies and accumulated experience. They are not the product of a deliberate and coherent design for the attainment of specific industrial goals. This point can be illustrated by reconstructing the actions of two national policy communities in crisis, that is in situations where established relationships come under greater strain than found under "normal" circumstances and, indeed, might be expected to break down entirely. A comparison of government intervention in the automobile industries of West Germany and France, 1971–1985, demonstrates the resilience of industrial policy communities. The maintenance of established relationships is shown to be part and parcel of the emerging industrial solution. Institutions and organizations involved in crisis resolution in the French and German motor industries are revealed to have dissimilar, overarching political objectives beyond the specific and immediate needs they seek to address. The imposition of such political factors onto industrial problems is not necessarily a disservice to an industry's long-term vitality.     

Swedish Lessons

As the global financial crisis emanating from the United States shuts down world markets, can globalization survive? Will the resurgent intrusion of the state—and thus politics—into the market lead to protectionism and collapse, as was the case in the early 20th century? Or will the new interconnectivity of climate change and mutual economic dependence—especially between China and the US—deepen global links? The former mayor of Shanghai, legendary Nobel economist Paul Samuelson and Third Way guru Anthony Giddens ponder those questions in this section.     

Who Blinks First? Legislative Patience and Bargaining with Governors

When legislators and governors clash over the size of American state government, what strategic factors determine who wins? Efforts to address this question have traditionally relied upon setter models borrowed from the congressional literature and have predicted legislative dominance. We offer an alternative simplification of state budget negotiations that follows the “staring match” logic captured by divide‐the‐dollar games. Our model predicts that governors will often be powerful but that professional legislatures can stand up to the executives when long legislative sessions give them the patience to endure a protracted battle over the size of the budget. In this article, we present our analysis of an original dataset comprising gubernatorial budget proposals and legislative enactments in the states from 1989 through 2004. The results indicate strong empirical support for our predictions.     

The Legal Factor in a Changing Africa

The address which follows was given before a joint meeting ofthe Royal African Society and the Royal Empire Society on July22, 1955. The meeting was arranged to coincide with the Commonwealthand Empire Legal Conference, and Colonel Charles Ponson by,T.D., D.L., presided.