THE HELPING HAND OF THE LAW: POLICE CONTROL OF CITIZENS ON REQUEST*

This study examines how patrol officers respond to citizens' requests that officers control another citizen—by advising or persuading them, warning or threatening them, making them leave someone alone or leave the scene, or arresting them. Data are drawn from field observations conducted in Indianapolis, Indiana, in 1996 and St. Petersburg, Florida, in 1997. Officers granted the request for the most restrictive form of control requested by the citizen in 70% of the 396 observed cases. Several factors were modeled to determine their influence on officers' decisions to grant or deny the most restrictive request. These factors include legal considerations, need, factors that attenuate the impact of law or need, the social relationship between the requester and target of control, and personal characteristics of the officer. Multivariate analysis shows that the most influential factors were legal considerations. When citizens requested an arrest, the likelihood that the police would be responsive dropped considerably. However, as the evidence of a legal violation against the targeted citizen increased, so did the odds of an arrest. Officers were less likely to grant the requests of citizens having a close relationship with the person targeted for control, disrespectful of the police, or intoxicated or mentally ill. The race, wealth, and organization affiliation of citizen adversaries had little impact on the police decision. Male officers, officers with fewer years of police experience, and officers with a stronger proclivity to community policing, had significantly greater odds of giving citizens what they requested. The implications of the findings for research and policy are discussed.     

An indirect legitimacy argument for a directly elected European Parliament

Can a directly elected European Parliament help deliver standards by which the European Union can be indirectly legitimated through its component national democracies? This article argues that the Union can be indirectly legitimate where it helps member state democracies meet their own obligations to their own publics. The Union can do just that by managing externalities in ways needed to secure core values of justice, democracy and freedom from arbitrary domination within member states. Yet that poses a predicament: for if any one member state has an interest in imposing negative externalities or in freeriding on positive externalities provided by another, then so may its voters and democratic institutions. The article argues a directly elected European Parliament can help manage that predicament both by identifying externalities and by ensuring their regulation meets standards of public control, political equality and justification owed to individual national democracies.     

A NEW METHOD FOR STUDYING THE EXTENT,STABILITY, AND PREDICTORS OF INDIVIDUAL SPECIALIZATION IN VIOLENCE*

Specialization in violence is an important scientific and policy topic, and over the past several decades, many analysis techniques for studying specialization have emerged. Research in this area continues to be hampered, however, by remaining methodological problems. To overcome these problems, we propose a new method for studying specialization in violence based on an item‐response theory measurement approach that is implemented through a multilevel regression model. Our approach defines specialization as an individual level latent variable, takes into account the inherent confounds between specialization and overall level of offending, and gauges specialization relative to the population base rates of each offense. Our method also enables researchers to 1) estimate the extent and statistical significance of specialization, 2) assess the stability of specialization over time, and 3) relate specialization to explanatory variables. Using data from three studies, we found substantial levels of specialization in violence, considerable stability in specialization over time, and several significant and relatively consistent relationships of specialization to explanatory variables such as gender, parental education, and risk‐seeking.     

UNSTRUCTURED SOCIALIZING,COLLECTIVE EFFICACY,AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOR AMONG URBAN YOUTH*

Relying on extensions of routine activities and social disorganization theories, we examine whether 1) neighborhood social characteristics shape opportunities for the development of unstructured socializing with peers among adolescents, 2) whether unstructured socializing leads to an increase in violent behavior within urban communities, and 3) whether neighborhood collective efficacy modifies the impact of unstructured socializing on violence. The study outlined in this article uses three waves of data from the Project on Human Development in Chicago Neighborhoods Community Survey and Longitudinal Cohort Study. Results from multilevel linear models suggest that neighborhood collective efficacy supports the development of unstructured socializing with peers. Multilevel Rasch models of violent behavior indicate that, consistent with previous research, unstructured socializing is a powerful predictor of violence. Collective efficacy exerts an independent influence on violent behavior and attenuates the effect of unstructured socializing on this outcome.     

Performance pressure: Patterns of partisanship and the economic vote

Numerous studies have demonstrated a weakening identification of voters with political parties in Western Europe over the last three decades. It is argued here that the growing proportion of voters with weak or no party affinities has strong implications for economic voting. When the proportion of voters with partisan affinities is low, the effect of economic performance on election outcomes is strong; when partisans proliferate, economic conditions matter less. Employing Eurobarometer data for eight European countries from 1976 to 1992, this inverse association between partisanship and the economic vote is demonstrated. This finding implies a growing effect for the objective economy on the vote in Europe. It helps explain an important puzzle in the economic voting literature: Weak results in aggregate level cross‐national studies of economic voting may be attributable to characteristics of the electorate, not just to the characteristics of government.     

THE VICTIM–OFFENDER OVERLAP IN CONTEXT: EXAMINING THE ROLE OF NEIGHBORHOOD STREET CULTURE*

Although numerous studies have found a strong relationship between offending and victimization risk, the etiology of this relationship is not well understood. Largely absent from this research is an explicit focus on neighborhood processes. However, theoretical work found in the subculture of violence literature implies that neighborhood street culture may help to account for the etiology of this phenomenon. Specifically, we should expect the magnitude of the victim–offender overlap to vary closely with neighborhood‐based violent conduct norms. This research uses waves 1 and 2 of the Family and Community Health Study (FACHS) to test the empirical validity of these notions. Our results show that the victim–offender overlap is not generalizeable across neighborhood contexts; in fact, it is especially strong in neighborhoods where the street culture predominates, whereas it is significantly weaker in areas where this culture is less prominent. These results indicate that neighborhood‐level cultural processes help to explain the victim–offender overlap, and they may cause this phenomenon to be context specific.     

PRIVATIZING UK TAX LAW ENFORCEMENT?

Tax law enforcement in the UK has long been dominated by public bureaucracies of the 'classic' type. This article reviews some current problems of tax law enforcement in that style, and looks at some possible ways of mitigating those problems. These include a change in penalty schedules and some measure of 're-privatization' of tax law enforcement, harking back to pre-bureaucratic enforcement styles. Six problems likely to be associated with privatization of tax law enforcement are discussed. These are not trivial, but it is argued that they may be somewhat less severe in the case of tax law enforcement than in that of law enforcement in general.