The Base Rate Study: Developing Base Rates for Risk Factors and Indicators for Engagement in Violent Extremism

Improvements have been made in identifying the prevalence of risk factors/indicators for violent extremism. A consistent problem is the lack of base rates. How to develop base rates is of equal concern. This study has two aims: (i) compare two methods for developing base rates; the Unmatched Count Technique (UCT) and direct questioning, (ii) generate base rates in a general population sample and compare these to a sample of lone-actor terrorists (n = 125). We surveyed 2108 subjects from the general population. Participants were recruited from an online access panel and randomly assigned to one of three conditions; direct survey, control, or UCT. Survey items were based on a lone-actor terrorist codebook developed from the wider literature. Direct questioning was more suitable under our study conditions where UCT resulted in deflation effects. Comparing the base rates identified a number of significant differences: (i) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated propensity indicators related to a cognitive susceptibility, and a crime- and/or violence-supportive morality more often; the general sample demonstrated protective factors more often, (ii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated situational indicators related to a crime- and/or violence-supportive morality more often, whereas the general sample experienced situational stressors more often, (iii) lone-actor terrorists demonstrated indicators related to exposure to extremism more often. Results suggest there are measurable differences in the prevalence of risk factors between lone-actor terrorists and the general population. However, no single factor “predicts” violent extremism. This bears implications for our understanding of the interrelation of risk and protective factors, and for the risk assessment of violent extremism.     

Suicidal Ideation Among Women Court-Referred to Batterer Intervention Programs

Identifying the prevalence and correlates of suicidal ideation in women mandated to batterer intervention programs is necessary to prevent suicide in this greatly understudied population. This study used cross-sectional, self-report survey methodology to identify the prevalence and correlates of suicidal ideation among 79 women attending batterer intervention programs. Of the sample, 33% reported experiencing suicidal ideation during the two weeks prior to entering the program. Multiple linear regression analysis indicated that (while controlling for number of batterer intervention sessions attended) symptoms of depression and borderline personality disorder, but not symptoms of antisocial personality disorder, were associated with suicidal ideation.     

Trajectories of Positive and Negative Behaviors from Early- to Middle-Adolescence

Although the positive youth development (PYD) model initially assumed inverse links between indicators of PYD and of risk/problem behaviors, empirical work in adolescence has suggested that more complex associations exist between trajectories of the two domains of functioning. To clarify the PYD model, this study assessed intraindividual change in positive and problematic indicators across Grades 5–10, and the links between these trajectories of development, among 2,516 participants from the 4-H Study of PYD (58.1% females; 64.9% European American, 7.0% African American, 12.3% Latino/a American, 2.6% Asian American or Pacific Islander, 1.8% Native American, 3.0% multiethnic-racial, and 8.4% with inconsistent race/ethnicity across waves). Results from person-centered analyses indicated that most youth clustered in the high trajectories of positive indicators and in the low trajectories of the negative ones. Consistent with past research, overlap between trajectories of positive and negative behaviors was found. These results suggest that theory and application need to accommodate to variation in the links between positive and problematic developmental trajectories.     

Community Stakeholder Responses to Countering Violent Extremism Locally

ABSTRACT

In the United States, despite federal efforts to empower communities to form local governance networks to develop and implement collaborative countering violent extremism (CVE) programs, local CVE governance networks are rare. Why do CVE governance networks emerge within only some communities? I argue that three factors—interest in CVE, capacity to participate, and facilitation—determine the prospects for the emergence of a CVE governance network within a community. The article uses a matching technique to identify and compare the community stakeholder responses to CVE in two communities—Houston, TX and Columbus, OH. Survey research of stakeholders who participated in Houston and stakeholders most likely to participate in Columbus but did not highlights the importance of the three factors. By focusing on these drivers of collaborative governance, the article provides an explanation for the lack of CVE collaboration in the United States.     

Real Reform or Change for Chumps: Earmark Policy Developments, 2006–2010

In response to widespread perceptions of problems associated with congressional earmarks, reform efforts began in late 2006 and continued through 2010. This essay summarizes those problems, explains the distribution of earmarks within Congress, and documents their rise and relative fall between 1991 and 2010 using government and public interest group databases. The author explains and critiques earmark reform policies, including congressional rules, initiatives taken by the congressional appropriations committees, and reforms pursued by the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Congressional rules and committee‐initiated reforms have been most effective, resulting in significant improvements in earmark transparency and accountability. The number and dollar value of earmarks first dropped noticeably in fiscal year 2007 after an earmark moratorium, and then stabilized as reforms were implemented. It is premature to conclude that these levels will continue or that reforms will alter the policy content of earmarks or their distribution among members of Congress.     

When do you follow the (national) leader? Party switching by subnational legislators in Japan

In 1993, after 38 years of single-party control, more than 20% of Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) House of Representatives members left the party to form new alternatives and create an anti-LDP coalition government. However, despite substantial popular support, the new parties attracted few subnational politicians. The effect of this lack of subnational party switching was substantial since the relatively small pool of subnational defectors meant that the new parties had difficulty forming the strong subnational bases of support that would help them to compete with the LDP in the future. In this paper, we consider why so few subnational politicians were willing to switch to these new party alternatives. Using case studies and conditional logit analysis of party affiliation pattern among prefectural assembly members in Japan, we find that party switching was most common among subnational politicians who had powerful patrons who had also left the LDP and had maintained especially good access to central government largesse. We also find that subnational politicians from urban areas, which depend less upon central government pork, were considerably less likely to switch parties, than their rural counterparts.     

Not Whether,But When? Governments’ Use of Militias in War

Abstract

Although government use of militias during civil conflict can ultimately undermine state authority, governments still use militias for battlefield assistance. This paper examines the selectivity of government decisions to use militias by disaggregating civil conflict to the level of battle phases. Civil-conflict battles typically consist of four phases: preparation, clear, hold, and build. I argue that governments decide to use militias based on the strength of government security forces, operational advantages of militias, and the type of battle phase. Governments will limit the use of militias during key battle phases that are likely to receive increased media attention unless a victory secured by government security forces is unlikely or militias hold an operational advantage. A comparative analysis of the offensive operations in Tikrit and Ramadi during Iraq’s war against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) lends initial support to this theory.