The internationalization of U.S. Criminal Law Enforcement

B.A., Victoria University of Wellington 1964; LL.B., Victoria University of Wellington 1964; LL.M., Victoria University of Wellington 1967; LL.M., Columbia University 1968; J.S.D., Columbia University 1972.     

American legal education: yesterday and today

This article does not have an abstract     

On the design of optimal mechanisms for the Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie economy

This essay presents necessary and sufficient first-order conditions for the general design of allocation mechanisms that decentralize Pareto optimal decisions in Arrow-Hahn-McKenzie (AHM) economies. An AHM economy is distinguished from the usual Arrow-Debreu private ownership economy since the consumption or production of any commodity may induce externalities, including initially endowed commodities. Because competitive markets will not generally internalize all externalities efficiently, the mechanism design must be generalized to include a rule that computes prices for commodities appearing as initial endowments so as to define consumers' individual budget sets. A natural design criterion for the generalized allocation mechanism is to have agents communicate both price and allocation messages to the center, enlarging the message space relative to that necessary for implementing mechanisms in Arrow-Debreu economies. The larger message spaces give agents increased flexibility, which has two significant consequences: (1) the dominant-strategy property of the Demand-Revealing Mechanism in economies with only public goods, a single pure private good, and quasilinear preferences, is lost unless the center adopts an enforcement structure that suitably restricts the allocation messages that agents may transmit; (2) if an endowed commodity is not a pure private good, then the Demand-Revealing Mechanism loses the dominant-strategy property, regardless of the enforcement structure adopted or of the nature of consumers' preferences, so that the problem is exacerbated in general AHM economies.     

Recent changes in the cabinet decision-making system in Ottawa

Abstract: In 1984 significant changes were made in the institutions and procedures which support cabinet decision-making in the Government of Canada. The changes instituted by prime ministers Turner arid Mulroney are summarized in the context of the evolution of the cabinet decision-making system since the Second World War. The principal ways in which the system put in place by Prime Minister Mulroney differ from that prevailing in the latter years of Prime Minister Trudeau's administration are described. The differences include: a larger cabinet; fewer cabinet committees; simplified procedures and fewer expenditure envelopes within the Policy and Expenditure Management System; the consolidation of public service support for cabinet committees within the Privy Council Office, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Department of Finance; and changes in the interdepartmental consultation process. Sommaire: En 1984, des changements importants ont été apportés aux méthodes et institutions servant le processus décisionnel du Conseil des ministres du gou-vernement canadien. Les changements institués par les premiers ministres Turner et Mulroney sont résumés ici et situés dans le contexte de I'évolution subie par le système décisionnel du Conseil des ministres depuis la deuxième guerre mondiale. L'auteur décrit les principales différences entre le système mis en place par le premier ministre Mulroney et le système qui fonctionnait pendant les dernières aiées de I'administration Trudeau. L'administration Mulroney se distingue notamment de I'administration précédente par les caractéristiques sui-vantes: un plus grand Conseil des ministres; une réduction du nombre de comités du Conseil des ministres; des procédures simplifiées et moins d'enveloppes de dépenses dans le cadre du Systéme de gestion des politiques et des dépenses; une concentration du soutien fourni par les fonctionnaires aux comités du Conseil des ministres au sein du Bureau du Conseil privé, du Secrétariat du Conseil du Trésor et du ministère des Finances; et enfin une modification du processus de consultation interministérielle.     

Public support for punishing white-collar crime: Blaming the victim revisited?

It is commonly asserted that white-collar crime flourishes because the public is unaware of its costs and indifferent to its control. Survey data collected in Illinois indicate, however, that the public perceives white-collar offenses to have greater economic and moral costs than conventional street crimes, though not to be as violent. More notably, our sample displayed strong support for the criminal sanctioning of white-collar offenders. Public attitudes thus do not appear to be either a major obstacle to attacking upper-world criminality, or its source. It is suggested that attempts to blame the public for its immense victimization serve only to divert attention from the real structural conditions that underlie both high rates of white-collar crime and the reluctance of the state to bring the lawlessness of the advantaged within the reach of the criminal law.