Risk Factors Associated with the Chronicity of High Potential for Child Abuse and Neglect

The present 4-year follow-up study involves 56 mothers who were evaluated by social agencies as being abusive and neglectful or at high risk for child abuse and neglect. The aim of the study is to analyze the relationship between psychosocial risk factors (relating to the history and current situation of the mothers) that were present at the time the families were initially recruited and the fact that some of the mothers continue to show a high potential for child abuse and neglect (chronic abuse and neglect), whereas others were able to overcome the problem (transitory abuse and neglect). Results indicate that the following variables are particularly associated with situations involving chronic problems of abuse and neglect: initial level of severity of potential for abuse and neglect; dual-parent status; a large number of children at the time of intervention (3.13 times more risk of chronicity for large families); the fact that as a child the mother herself had been placed in a foster home (3.7 times more risk); that she had been sexually abused (3.5 times more risk); and that as an adolescent she had run away from home (3.02 times more risk). Our results indicate that mothers who have a combination of more than eight risk factors are four times more likely to be in the chronic group.     

Differences in assessments of relative prestige and utility of criminal justice and criminology journals

Several articles have been written about the relative prestige of journals in criminology and criminal justice. Almost uniformly, however, those rankings have focused on sociology and criminology journals and have generally reflected a sociological orientation. If criminal justice is indeed a separate discipline, such approaches are tantamount to asking psychologists to rate sociological journals within a list of psychology journals. Our approach is first to separate respondents by their degree of identification with criminal justice and their educational orientation. Second, we compile a list of responses to questions about prestige and utility to practitioners across the range of criminal justice and criminology journals. Analyses of these data indicate that there are differences in the way scholars rate journals, based on their identity with criminal justice and their educational orientation. These differences, however, are found in specific journals and in types of journals (i.e., police, corrections, criminal justice) rather than in aggregate perceptions of all criminal justice and criminology journals.     

The law and economics of supranationalism: the European Union and the subsidiarity principle in collective action perspective

This article, prepared for an issue devoted to the work of Judge Richard A. Posner, considers the implications of law and economics for the structure of supranational organizations, with particular attention to the application of collective action theory to the relationships among states in the EU. After discussing the connections between this approach and Judge Posner’s work, the article describes collective action theory and its implications for our understanding of the state and of relationships among states. From this perspective, supranational organizations such as the EU can be understood as institutional structures that facilitate collective action among states by reducing the transactions and enforcement costs of making and implementing collective decisions. At the same time, the delegation of authority to supranational institutions creates agency costs for states and their peoples because the interests of the state and its people diverge from the interests of the collective in some instances. Viewed in this perspective, the institutional structure of the EU—like that of other supranational organizations or federal nation states—reflects an effort to strike a balance between collective decision making and local control so as to maximize the collective gains and minimize the resulting agency costs. Understood in these terms, various features of the EU’s institutional design make sense. The ordinary legislative process permits the EU to act without the unanimous consent of member states, thus reducing transactions costs in those areas where collective action is necessary, particularly in relation to the creation and regulation of the internal market. The EU reduces enforcement costs through principles of direct applicability or effects and the supremacy of EU law, which are effective legal restraints in states governed by the rule of law. The institutional structure of the EU also incorporates a representative and deliberative process for collective action that helps control the resulting agency costs for member states and their peoples through supermajority and co-decisional requirements. The collective action perspective also illuminates the function of the subsidiarity principle and the enhanced role of national parliaments in its enforcement.