Policy Networks And Agricultural Policy Reforms: Explaining Deregulation In Sweden And Re‐Regulation In The European Community

Policy network analysis has been criticized for being unable to explain outcomes and change in outcomes. This article develops a theoretical network model which attempts to explain reform outcomes. It suggests that the success of reformers depends mainly on the policy network type existing in the sector in which they attempt to bring about change. If the network has a high degree of cohesion, then those network members who are subject to reform have power to defend the principles of the established policy. Consequently, only moderate policy reform occurs. On the other hand, if the network's degree of cohesion is low, then those who are subject to reform do not have the power to oppose reformers successfully. Therefore, reformers have opportunities to bring about fundamental policy reform. Differences in the cohesion of agricultural policy networks help to explain why the 1990 Swedish agricultural policy reform was more radical than the European Community's in 1992.     

Try Federalism

The present article follows up a previous study (Anckar 1998) which showed a strong association between size and party system fragmentation. The aim of the article is to see whether the explanatory power of size can, in fact, be attributed to a federal form of government. 77 countries with free party systems constitute the research population. The dependent variable has three components: number of parties, electoral support for the leading party, and the 'effective number of parties' calculated according to the Laakso-Taagepera formula. Preliminary tests reveal that federal states have a more fragmented party system than unitary states. However, when controlling for size, electoral system, the 'effective threshold,' and presidentialism, the results clearly show that federalism is overshadowed by size and also, to a lesser extent, by the effective threshold.     

Quangos—What's in a Name? Defining Quangos from a Comparative Perspective

Without definitional clarity the "quango debate" is inherently flawed and meaningful progress undermined. A possible solution to this problem is proposed in this article by way of a subsectional map which aims to clarify the quango topography. This accepts the diversity inherent in the quango debate while allowing for increased clarity and focused research. This, the authors believe, is the only way forward for practitioners, academics and policymakers working within the sphere of quasi-government. There is a need to address precise forms or subsections of the quango continuum as studies or reforms which focus on one type of quango would not necessarily work if applied to all quangos, or quangos in other countries.     

Development policy and the evaluation of community self-help: The harambee school movement in Kenya

This attempt to objectively assess the costs and benefits of involvement in the harambee education movement for individuals and families is directed at policymakers and is an exercise in policy analysis. Evaluative studies of this nature are essential to the improvement of the of the overall quality of policymaking. Despite general agreement that harambee education projects involving secondary schools differ in many ways from types of self-help projects, few attempts have been made to assess the long-term social impact of the harambee education movement. For nearly 2 decades Kenya's harambee movement has flourished and has been largely viewed as a positive contribution to national development. Between 1969-79, the total value of contributions to self-help projects rose from around $6 million to almost $27 million, demostrating the substantial inputs of local communities to the economic growth of the country as a whole. Policymakers, after initial reservations about independent self-help, in recent years have come to rely on such activities as complementary to the government's efforts. Self-help activities aimed at expanding educational opportunity are the most significant in terms of both monetary resources expended and the scope of human involvement. Benefits are difficult to extimate. The growing number of students in harambee schools does not necessarly indicate that the majority of these students are acquiring marketable skills or that their consequent levels of academic training will prepare them to complete successfully in the job market with the average student educated in government-sponsored schools. The evidence, in fact, clearly points in the opposite direction. Yet, politicians, policymakers, and citizens continue to regard harambee activities for expanding educational opportunities atall levels as necessary contributions to Kenya's development program and to individual achievement. The direct cost to government for harambee education can be compared with the direct private expenditure on this type of ecucation. The 1976 annual private investment in harambee education was $45 million. The most direct benefits from harambee efforts are reaped by wealthier regions and communities in Kenya. The greaes social benefits derived from the government's policy toward the harambee school movement are political benefits. By symbolically drawing linkages between its national development strategy and independent self-help activities, the government can elicit the tacit support of rural communities. Direct social costs of such a policy are minimal. The indirect, long-term costs may result in disastrous, unintended consequences as the pool of educated and unemployed youths expands and as resulting ethnic and class inequalities sharpen and crystallize.