The Optional Protocol: in the best interest of whom?

Chris Dolan is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Between 1998 and 2002, he spent some 24 months conducting fieldwork in northern Uganda.     

Trends in the management of registered sexual offenders across England and Wales: a geographical approach to the study of sexual offending

Abstract

Social scientists, and geographers in particular, have long been interested in examining spatial patterns of offending in order to generate a “geography” of crime and criminality. This paper examines what value, if any, a geographical approach to the study of sexual offending might offer. Utilising published official data from England and Wales it presents for the first time geographical analyses of the registration, risk assessment and management of Registered Sexual Offenders (RSOs) across 42 Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement (MAPPA) areas. In doing so it considers and evaluates the methodological issues pertaining to the use of such data and such a geographical approach. We conclude that geographical interpretations of both the incidence of RSOs and the rates of risk allocations between MAPPA areas provide valuable insights and raise new questions about the way in which RSOs are managed nationally and are thus worthy of further exploration.     

The other resource curse: extractives as development panacea

Since 2010, many African governments have challenged twenty years of extractive sector liberalization that has played a key role in unlocking mineral riches and attracting foreign direct investment. The potential for extractives to drive economic structural transformation is intuitively attractive, the Africa Mining Vision (2009) document providing a primary template. Geological inheritance alone, however, is not a panacea for economic development, industrialization or poverty alleviation. While much attention to the ‘resource curse’ has identified the problem of excessive rent-seeking and the consequent impact on elite consolidation, democracy, governance and macroeconomic distortions, a more fundamental problem, the ‘other resource curse’, may be an overlooked driver: a lingering assumption that mineral resources should straightforwardly provide significant revenue streams for public goods, inputs for industrial transformation, and extensive employment. Geology alone is neither conducive nor antithetical to economic development. Stakeholders require a more comprehensive understanding of the possibilities and limits of extractives in contemporary Africa.     

The foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state: South Africa as case study

With South Africa having declared itself a developmental state, this paper posits that if a developmental state is one that drives development, then the foreign policy of such a state should pursue development as one of its most important goals. Similarly the diplomatic corps of such a state should prioritise economic, commercial, para- and public diplomacy as drivers of diplomacy. In answering the question, ‘What should be the foreign policy and diplomatic attributes of a developmental state?’, the authors, through an exploratory approach, seek to analyse how well the state has fared in achieving this objective. To be a successful developmental state, a strategic capacity should exist and a clear strategic conception of the state's national interest should be formulated. Old paradigms about the role and functions of the diplomatic corps are challenged and a meritocratic diplomatic corps is strongly advocated to support the state's declared developmental goals.     

Post-Contractual Lock-in and the UK Private Finance Initiative (PFI): the Cases of National Savings and Investments and the Lord Chancellor's Department

According to the UK government, one of the key features of the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is the scope it provides to transfer risk to private sector suppliers. Under the PFI, public bodies are expected to develop interdependent relationships with suppliers that allow risk to be transferred. However, it is the argument of the author that it will not always be possible for interdependent relationships to be engineered by public bodies – on many occasions, public bodies will find themselves asymmetrically locked-in to their supplier. This situation leads to private sector suppliers becoming dominant in those relationships which, in turn, will allow them to pass back risk and obtain greater returns. As a result, the author argues that it is not a question of whether risk can be transferred under the PFI, but when. This argument is illustrated by use of the contracts managed by the UK National Savings and Investments and the UK Lord Chancellor's Department.