Intense Preferences, Strong Beliefs and Democratic Decision-making

Some decisions require individuals to make judgements rather than to express preferences. Some conflicts of preference arise from different beliefs about the efficacy or propriety of a policy rather than from different wants. Should the 'intensity' with which a judgement is made, or a belief is held, figure in decision-making in the way that it should ideally influence decisions concerning wants? This article questions the relevance of intensity to matters of judgement and examines how far decision processes that are sensitive to different intensities of preference, such as pressure group activity, vote trading and point voting, are o pen to criticism for failing to discriminate between intense wants and strong beliefs.     

Comparison of ethanol concentrations in venous blood and end-expired breath during a controlled drinking study

Concentration-time profiles of ethanol were determined for venous whole blood and end-expired breath during a controlled drinking experiment in which healthy men (n=9) and women (n=9) drank 0.40-0.65 g ethanol per kg body weight in 20-30 min. Specimens of blood and breath were obtained for analysis of ethanol starting at 50-60 min post-dosing and then every 30-60 min for 3-6 h. This protocol furnished 130 blood-breath pairs for statistical evaluation. Blood-ethanol concentration (BAC, mg/g) was determined by headspace gas chromatography and breath-ethanol concentration (BrAC, mg/2l) was determined with a quantitative infrared analyzer (Intoxilyzer 5000S), which is the instrument currently used in Sweden for legal purposes. In 18 instances the Intoxilyzer 5000S gave readings of 0.00 mg/2l whereas the actual BAC was 0.08 mg/g on average (range 0.04-0.15 mg/g). The remaining 112 blood- and breath-alcohol measurements were highly correlated (r=0.97) and the regression relationship was BAC=0.10+0.91BrAC and the residual standard deviation (S.D.) was 0.042 mg/g (8.4%). The slope (0.91+/-0.0217) differed significantly from unity being 9% low and the intercept (0.10+/-0.0101) deviated from zero (t=10.2, P<0.001), indicating the presence of both proportional and constant bias, respectively. The mean bias (BAC - BrAC) was 0.068 mg/g and the 95% limits of agreement were -0.021 and 0.156 mg/g. The average BAC/BrAC ratio was 2448+/-540 (+/-S.D.) with a median of 2351 and 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles of 1836 and 4082. We found no significant gender-related differences in BAC/BrAC ratios, being 2553+/-576 for men and 2417+/-494 for women (t=1.34, P>0.05). The mean rate of ethanol disappearance from blood was 0.157+/-0.021 mg/(g per hour), which was very close to the elimination rate from breath of 0.161+/-0.021 mg/(2l per hour) (P>0.05). Breath-test results obtained with Intoxilyzer 5000S (mg/2l) were generally less than the coexisting concentrations of ethanol in venous blood (mg/g), which gives an advantage to the suspect who provides breath compared with blood in cases close to a threshold alcohol limit.     

Differences in self-report measures by adolescent sex offender risk group

Differences in self-reports among three groups of juvenile sex offenders (N = 162) were examined. Risk was defined as the sum of the following static variables based on interviews with juveniles and others and from written records: type of offense (violent or predatory = 1, not = 0), prior sex offense (any = 1, none = 0), history of sexual abuse (self or family = 1, none = 0), history of substance abuse (self or family = 1, none = 0), history of behavior problems (yes = 1, no = 0), and unstable home life (yes = 1, stable = 0). Low-risk (0 to 2 risk factors), medium-risk (3 factors), and high-risk (4 to 6 factors) groups of offenders were formed. Univariate ANCOVAs indicated that the high-risk group reported less family cohesion, more aggression, lower self-esteem, more social discomfort, and more frequent and extreme sexual fantasies. The implications of these findings for differential identification of and interventions with adolescent sex offenders are discussed.     

Driving under the influence of chlormethiazole

This article describes a case of driving under the influence of the sedative-hypnotic-anticonvulsant drug chlormethiazole. The suspect, who was a physician, was driving dangerously on a busy highway and caused a traffic collision. When apprehended by the police, the man had bloodshot and glazed eyes and pupil size was enlarged. He could not answer the questions properly and his gait was unsteady. A roadside breath-alcohol screening test was positive but an evidential breath-alcohol test conducted about one hour later was below the legal limit for driving of 0.10 mg/L (10 microg/100 mL or 0.021 g/210 L). Because of the special circumstances of the traffic crash and the man's appearance and behaviour, the police suspected that drugs other than alcohol were involved and obtained a venous blood sample for toxicological analysis. The blood contained 0.23 mg/g alcohol, which is above the legal limit for driving in Sweden 0.20 mg/g (20 mg/100 mL or 0.020 g/100 mL), and codeine was also present at a therapeutic concentration of 0.02 mg/L. The conflict between the clinical signs of impairment and the toxicology report prompted a reanalysis of the blood sample with major focus on sedative-hypnotic drugs. Analysis by capillary GC-NPD identified chlormethiazole at a concentration of 5mg/L, the highest so far encountered in traffic cases in Sweden. In 13 other impaired driving cases over 10 years the mean (median) and range of concentrations of chlormethiazole were 1.6 mg/L (1.6 mg/L) and 0.3-3.3 mg/L. This case report underscores the need to consider clinical observations and the person's behaviour in relation to the toxicology report when interpreting and testifying in drug-impaired driving cases.     

Learning from the Philippine occupation: nation‐building and institutional development in Iraq and other high security risk nations

Outcomes of armed conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq indicate that the U.S. has been unprepared to fully address problems related to establishing social and economic stability, security and governance in the aftermath of war. This is unfortunate, given that U.S. policy makers' nation‐building efforts to achieve stability, security and good governance in these nations do not reflect what they should already have learnt about organisational and institutional development from past experiences providing significant development assistance to highly unstable nations. Based on the analysis rendered in this article, ‘smart practice’ development administration in such nations comprises the following key points that link nation building to institutional/organisational development:

• Nation building (creating new national sovereignty) is different from, and harder than, building government capacity (creating or strengthening institutions and organisations).
• Given that building government capacity typically requires years of patient assistance and financing, it is better to build on existing indigenous institutions like the civil service and military.
• The time and expense of development assistance to high security risk nations means that it is advisable to establish a multi‐lateral development assistance plan and a multi‐national, multi‐institutional framework for financing development to pay for all that is necessary over a long period of time (i.e. 20–50 years).
• Policy makers should emphasise social stability and stable economic growth under self‐governance to prevent actual or perceived economic exploitation.
• Policy makers' diplomatic efforts should secure accommodation of various stakeholders sufficient to permit compromise leading to formation of an independent government.
• Where occupation appears necessary to achieve security and stability, policy makers should allocate enough troops and money to do the job, and accurately assess and report all costs of military occupation and nation building.
• Once occupation has occurred, policy makers should not withdraw military support in a way that would increase the likelihood of civil war.
• Premature withdrawal of security, economic and political support prior to the point where high security risk nations are capable of governing themselves will cause a power vacuum, and may result in fragmented regional leadership by warlords. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

     

Policy Coherence, Global Environmental Governance, and Poverty Reduction

This paper explores linkages between policy coherence, global environmental governance, and poverty reduction. It begins with a few thoughts on what these terms mean, and how they are linked. It then provides some perspectives on how the linkages might be improved over time. The paper takes the view that the most coherent institutional framework for both poverty reduction and environmental protection is likely to be one that is relatively decentralised, and based on a modular (networking) structure. The implication is that this framework should rely mainly on domestic and regional governance institutions, rather than on global ones. Effective management of environmental problems (both national and international) also implies a judicious mix of strong government institutions, smooth-functioning markets, and well-targeted infrastructure investments. The business and labour communities are therefore crucial. Other elements of civil society, notably the NGOs, also have important roles to play. Global environmental governance will have to overcome significant resistance insofar as the interests of the developing countries are concerned. Developing countries will need to be convinced that it is in their best interest to participate in global environmental institutions. The best way of making this case is to link (local) poverty reduction objectives explicitly to (both local and global) environmental protection goals. Bringing greater coherence to international trade, investment, and development co-operation policies could make an important contribution to strengthening these linkages. Investment is particularly important here – in the future, investment governance will likely prove to be more important for poverty reduction than environmental governance. Focusing on global environmental governance will not be enough.