The Consequences of Electoral Institutions for Careerism

Although electoral institutions have been shown to have a variety of effects, scholars have not investigated if certain voting rules enable politicians to enjoy longer legislative careers. I took advantage of a natural experiment—a sudden transition from a semiproportional voting rule to single‐member districts with plurality voting (SMDP)—to measure the effect of electoral institutions on careerism. My analysis revealed that voting rules have a profound influence on the dynamics of legislative careers: politicians elected under SMDP are far less likely to suffer electoral defeat or to retire than those elected via cumulative voting. The findings of this study not only provide additional insight into the seat safety of politicians elected in first‐past‐the‐post systems, but moreover offer new criteria by which to evaluate the choice of electoral institutions.     

Going Down on Good Neighbours: Imagining América in Hollywood Movies of the 1930s and 1940s (Flying Down to Rio and Down Argentine Way)

During the Good Neighbor Era of the 1930s and 1940s, the USA sought to normalise relations with Latin America in order to promote hemispheric unity, particularly so after the outbreak of the Second World War, which provoked anxiety about transatlantic trade routes and South American attitudes towards the Axis. An Office of the Co-ordinator of Inter-American Affairs was established, which in turn set up a Motion Picture Division. The Division pressed for a Latin American specialist to monitor and control representations of Latin America via the Production Code Administration. The attempt to promote positive portrayals of Latin Americans assisted a boom in musical comedies dealing with North Americans visiting their southern neighbours. This article examines an early precursor, Flying Down to Rio (1933), and a full-blown Good Neighbor movie, Down Argentine Way (1940). The article uncovers, behind the optimistic projection of neighbourliness, hidden tensions and deep-rooted anxieties about American identities.     

Congressional Performance,Incumbent Behavior,and Voting in Senate Elections

Conventional wisdom suggests that individual members of Congress have no real incentive to act in ways that might improve public evaluations of their collective body. In particular, the literature provides no clear evidence that public evaluations of Congress affect individual races for Congress, and little reason to expect that voters would hold specific individuals responsible for the institution's performance. We suggest that this conventional wisdom is incorrect. Using multiple state‐level exit polls of Senate voting conducted by Voter News Service in 1996 and 1998, we arrive at two key findings. First, we find that evaluations of Congress do have a significant effect on voting within individual U.S. Senate races across a wide variety of electoral contexts. Second, we find that punishments or rewards for congressional performance are not distributed equally across all members, or even across members of a particular party. Instead, we find that the degree to which citizens hold a senator accountable for congressional performance is significantly influenced by that senator's actual level of support for the majority party in Congress, as demonstrated on party votes.