Decentralization and Fiscal Discipline in Sub-national Governments: Evidence from the Swiss Federal System

This article analyses the relationship between decentralizationand the extent of fiscal discipline in the Swiss cantons between1984 and 2000. From a theoretical point of view, decentralizationand federalism can be associated with both an expansive anda dampening effect on government debt. On the one hand, decentralizedstructures have been argued to lead to a reduction of debt dueto inherent competition between the member states and the multitudeof veto positions which restrict public intervention. On theother hand, decentralization has been claimed to contributeto an increase of public debt as it involves expensive functionaland organizational duplications as well as cost-intensive, oftendebt-financed, compromise solutions between a large number ofactors that operate in an uncoordinated and contradictory way.Our empirical results show that in periods of prosperous economicdevelopment, the architecture of state structure has no impacton debt. However, the degree of decentralization influencesdebt in economically poor times: In phases of economic recession,administratively decentralized cantons implement a more economicalbudgetary policy than centralized Swiss member states.     

Promotion of the Agricultural Sector and Political Power in Austria

In most industrialized countries farmers as a small and well orgnized group are ableto influence government decisions to get rent creating proposals enacted. Two different viewsare presented to explain why: the Chicagoan view (“Efficient Redistribution Hypothesis”)and the Virginian view (inefficient outcome of political bargaining). A vertically structuredempirical model of the Austrian farm sector is employed to test both hypotheses. Quantitativeresults of the welfare transfers from consumers/taxpayers to farmers and agribusiness firmsare derived and the political weights of these groups are presented.     

The impact of constitutional structures and collective and competitive veto points on income inequality in industrialized democracies

Abstract This paper presents the first systematic, empirical examination of the impact of constitutional structures on income inequality among eighteen OECD countries. Our pooled time series/cross–sectional panel analysis (n = 18, t = 2) reveals that consensual political institutions are systematically related to lower income inequalities while the reverse is true for majoritarian political institutions. We also make a crucial distinction between 'collective' and 'competitive' veto points. Our multiple regression results provide strong evidence that collective veto points depress income inequalities while competitive veto points tend to widen the inequality of incomes. Thus, some institutional veto points have constraining effects on policy while others have 'enabling' effects.     

Schweizer Welten des Sozialkapitals. Empirische Untersuchungen zum sozialen Leben in Regionen und Kantonen

To what extent do the Swiss Regions and Cantons differ with regard to their stock of social capital? Based on the data of the Swiss Household Panel this article presents the first empirical investigation of the accumulation of social capital in Swiss sub‐national units in a comparative perspective. Empirical evidence implies that the cantons of the German speaking region show more social capital than the French and Italian speaking parts of the country measured by the engagement in voluntary associations, or the interaction with colleagues and the neighbourhood. However, the Latin cantons show a greater stock of social interaction among family and close friends. Furthermore, our findings provide evidence for the existence of five Swiss worlds of social capital varying among the various types of social interaction.     

News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout

Despite dramatic increases in available political information through cable television and the Internet, political knowledge and turnout have not changed noticeably. To explain this seeming paradox, I argue that greater media choice makes it easier for people to find their preferred content. People who like news take advantage of abundant political information to become more knowledgeable and more likely to turn out. In contrast, people who prefer entertainment abandon the news and become less likely to learn about politics and go to the polls. To test this proposition, I develop a measure of people's media content preference and include it in a representative opinion survey of 2,358 U.S. residents. Results show that content preference indeed becomes a better predictor of political knowledge and turnout as media choice increases. Cable TV and the Internet increase gaps in knowledge and turnout between people who prefer news and people who prefer entertainment.     

Die Bildungsfinanzen der Schweizer Kantone. Der Einfluss sozioökonomischer Bedingungen,organisierter Interessen und politischer Institutionen auf die Bildungsausgaben im kantonalen Vergleich

This article seeks to explain cross‐cantonal variation in public education expenditure between 1985 and 1998. Four possible explanations are located: socio‐demographic and socio‐economic pressures, the impact of political institutions, the partisan theory, and the power resources of organized interests. Taking the research advantage of Swiss federalism our findings provide strong evidence that educational expenditure is systematically related to the socio‐demographic and socio‐economic pressures in a given canton. Furthermore, consensus democracy promotes educational finance, while the decentralization of the cantonal polity lessens the educational policy output. Finally, the instruments of direct democracy as well as partisan variables do not seem to account for differences regarding the budget expenditures on education in the Swiss cantons.     

Intolerance Toward Immigrants in Switzerland: Diminished Threat Through Social Contacts?

Intolerance toward immigrants has recently reached noticeable highs in Switzerland. Referring to the conflict theory, the perception of a specific group as a threat tends to lead to intolerance toward that group. The expectation of a negative relationship between threat and tolerance is nevertheless not assumed to be universally valid for all members of society. In particular, the contact theory assumes that intercultural encounters should promote positive attitudes toward culturally different individuals and groups. Using a new and unique data set, our Heckman selection models reveal that Swiss who view rising immigration to mean a loss of economic privileges and an erosion of Swiss cultural values are less tolerant toward immigrants. Moreover, our results indicate that contact with immigrants may moderate this effect. However, not all group settings are able to reduce the perceived threats in a similar way, and not all sorts of social contact are able to foster tolerance toward immigrants.     

Governance of professional sports leagues—Cooperatives versus contracts

Historically, European team sports leagues were run by their respective national and international associations and were legally independent from the professional clubs playing in these leagues. Recently, European leagues have adopted an organizational form similar to their North American counterparts who are organized since their beginning in a cooperative-like manner. Based on a comparative institutional analysis, we explain the advantages of the cooperative form of league organization over contractual governance. With our four-stage game-theoretic model, we show that contractual governance of sports leagues leads to larger investment distortions than cooperative league organization.