Transgression and (sexual) citizenship: the political struggle for self-determination within BDSM communities

There has been – and continues to be – a tension within the political strategies of sexual minority communities claiming citizenship. Whilst attempting to forge a political self-determination based on being (dissident) sexual subjects, members of sexually diverse communities have frequently engaged in political practices that normalize their diversity to accord with wider socio-cultural conventions. In this article, we address this issue in relation to the political strategies of one of the most marginalized sexual identities/practices: BDSM. By drawing on the work of Foucault, Rose, Rabinow and Bahktin, we advance a case for how it may be possible for dissident sexual communities to resist the normalizing effects of citizenship whilst still making claims for legal recognition and wider social acknowledgment. Key to the argument is the theorization of a position wherein carnival transgression operates within a dialectical integration of ideology and utopia as a mode of citizenship.     

Tom Borcherding

Thomas E Borcherding passed away on February 12, 2014, of congestive heart failure. He was 74. He is survived by his wife, Rhoda, and his sons Matthew and Benjamin. He made important, lasting contributions to the discipline of economics, particularly to the fields of public choice and law and economics. While the profession will surely miss his scholarly contributions in the future, we will continue to learn from the insights he has left behind in the academic literature and in our memories. The personal contributions he made to the lives of family members, colleagues, students, and friends will be missed even more acutely. Tom was an important presence in our lives. The absence of his kindness, generosity, keen wit and buoyant personality will be missed by all who knew him.     

The Bitter Product of Defeat? Reflections on Winstanley's Law of Freedom

The Law of Freedom in a Platform was Gerrard Winstanley's final published work. It appeared in February 1652, nearly two years after the dissolution of the 'Digger' commune in Surrey of which he had been the principal spokesperson. The book is said to differ markedly from his previous writings. In particular, his depiction of a disciplinary state apparatus is contrasted to his earlier rejection of state authority, and his appeal to a utopian legislator (Cromwell) is contrasted to his earlier emphasis on the self-emancipation of the poor. In accounting for this shift of position, commentators often refer to the 'bitter' experience of the Diggers' defeat. Confronted everywhere by ignorance and persecution, Winstanley came to realise that institutionalised discipline was required to counter human imperfection and that emancipation could only come from the top down. This paper questions such an argument. It suggests that in almost every respect The Law of Freedom remained consistent with Winstanley's other writings and that no transformation in his thought took place. What apparent differences there were stemmed from the challenges presented by the utopian genre, and the paper concludes by arguing that Winstanley's achievement lies in his having risen to these challenges.     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.