CRIME BY COMMITTEE: CONSPIRATORS AND COMPANY MEN IN THE ILLEGAL ELECTRICAL INDUSTRY CARTEL, 1954–19591

We show how cartels rely on the adaptive social structure of committee meetings to ameliorate the competitive difficulties of markets. We distill the structure of the cartel committee and test hypotheses relating market structure to committee structure and ultimately to the efficacy of cartel price‐fixing. Cartel continuity and the corporate authority of the cartel are strong predictors of cartel effectiveness. Cartel continuity is responsive to market conditions that favor cartel formation. Centralization of cartel authority in decision making results in improved collusive pricing effectiveness. Centralization of cartel authority responds to expanding industry volume that bring about incentives to increase firm level market share at the expense of other cartel members.     

MEETING THE CHALLENGE OF TECHNOLOGY‐DRIVEN CHANGE WITHIN AN INSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT: THE GREEK CASE

Propelled by the driving forces of globalization and technology explosion, public institutions face the challenge of rapid and discontinuous change. Such change has come to undermine the relevance of traditional approaches on how an institution should be managed. We analyse a technology‐driven change effort, the implementation of an Integrated Information System (IIS), that unfolds within the boundaries of the institutional context of the Hellenic Parliament. The purpose of our research, which reports on a qualitative field study, is to explore and understand how the particularities of technology‐driven change on the one hand, and institutional change on the other, can be integrated, paying particular attention to how the different actors involved in the process interact and affect the unfolding of such a change effort. Our findings show that strong friction did indeed occur between old and new institutional factors, but that the key factor enabling the change effort to advance and finally gain legitimation was the encouragement and support in the institutional change process of opportunity‐based and emerging changes, as proposed by the technological change literature.     

The Theory of Legal Dynamics Reconsidered*

Abstract. The author criticizes Kelsen's distinction between static and dynamic systems of norms and his theory of legal dynamics. The author moreover presents the institutionalist conception of legal dynamics. Kelsen's concept of static systems is incompatible with normological scepticism: The deduction of rules from a basic principle depends on additional premises; even in static systems there is a kind of dynamics produced by actual facts. Kelsen's conception of legal dynamics is also incompatible with normological scepticism and with Kelsen's demand of purity of jurisprudence. In the institutionalist conception Iegal dynamics is rather conceived as an interplay of legal norms and facts. Empowering relations, the principle of co-validity, temporal limits of norms, derogation, legal validity and the basic norm are analysed accordingly. Appendices deal with Paulson's empowering theory of legal norm and Lippold's double-faced reconstruction of the legal order.