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861.
Hill  Edward W. 《Publius》1991,21(3):27-41
The crisis in the banking and thrift industries is catalyzinga shift in the traditional system of dual state-federal bankregulation toward the federal government and away from the states.Erosion in this system has been evident for the past decadedue to actions of the Congress, federal regulators, and thejudiciary. The dual system has two sets of flaws. One is regulatorycompetition that encourages weak monitoring of financial institutionsby states. The other is created by the "moral hazard" of thecurrent system of federal deposit insurance. There are two pathsto reform. One is continued erosion of the power of the states.The alternative is to provide incentives that reinforce thedual system of regulation and deter the sources of "moral hazard."  相似文献   
862.
López  Edward J. 《Public Choice》2003,114(1-2):1-56
This paper consults multiple literatures to specify andevaluate the economic rationales for term limitation,particularly on Congress. I first consider theories that aroseto explain, among related issues, why individual states mightunilaterally self-impose term limits on their own delegationsto Congress. Next I consider two main lines of argument foruniversal limits, both of which begin with the empiricalphenomenon of high and rising congressional tenure. First,supporters of term limits argue that higher tenure biaseslegislatures toward inefficiency big government (highspending). Second, higher tenure creates inefficient (anti-competitive) conditions in the legislative election market.Term limitation would remedy these inefficiencies by virtue ofdecreasing average tenure. These claims are then evaluated inlight of the evidence amassed in the literature. Based on theliterature reviewed, this paper finds that, while term limitswill reduce average tenure, there is no evidence to suggestthat term limits will affect the underlying causes of theseinefficiencies. Further research on a more general reform,which would strike deeper at these underlying causes, isimplied.  相似文献   
863.
The author wished to determine the effect of selected variables on dating adjustment. Questionnaires were administered to 200 males and 130 females in introductory social science classes at a midwestern university. The results of stepwise regression indicated that the variables of frequency, commitment, and age of initial dating were the strongest influences on the dating adjustment of both sexes. Social orientation was found to be significant for the dating adjustment of males but not of females.Received his Ph.D. in sociology from Iowa State University. Current interest is the sociology of adolescence, particularly dating and sexual relations.  相似文献   
864.
865.
How does the territorial distribution of political and economic resources within national polities influence politics and policy making? This article examines the electoral dynamics of market reform in Argentina between 1989 and 1995. It provides insights into the way that the distribution of economic and institutional resources in federal systems shapes policy making and coalition building options for reformist governments. The electoral viability of the governing Peronist Party during the economic reform period was facilitated by the regional phasing of the costs of market reform. Structural reforms were concentrated primarily on economically developed regions of the country, while public spending and patronage in economically marginal but politically overrepresented regions sustained support for the governing party. Statistical analyses contrast patterns of spending and public sector employment in “metropolitan” and “peripheral” regions of the country during the reform period, as well as the social bases of electoral support in those regions. A conceptual distinction between “high-maintenance” and “low-maintenance” constituencies is also introduced to shed light on the dynamics of patronage spending in contexts of market reform.  相似文献   
866.
Harry Harding, A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China since 1972 (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1992).

Richard Madsen, China and the American Dream: A Moral Inquiry (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995).

A. Owen Aldridge, The Dragon and the Eagle: The Presence of China in the American Enlightenment (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1993).

David Shambaugh, Beautiful Imperialist: China Perceives America, 1972–1990 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).

Jie Chen, Ideology in US Foreign Policy: Case Studies in US China Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 1992).

Shu Guang Zhang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese‐American Confrontations, 1949–1958 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).

Qiang Zhai, The Dragon, the Lion, and the Eagle: Chinese‐British‐American Relations, 1949–1958 (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1994).  相似文献   

867.
868.
The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments   总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1  
This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their revenues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determine local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property taxes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower overall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the late 1970s; one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is that in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive devices.  相似文献   
869.
Edward C.  Page 《Political studies》1990,38(3):438-452
The internationalization of political science makes it especially difficult to identify a distinctive British approach to comparative politics. While there is certainly evidence of a distaste for cross-national comparison in Britain, this is no more marked than in other countries. In fact, on the evidence of a survey of major journals, Britons make relatively heavy use of the comparative method. British comparative research is less likely to use statistical indicators and methods than that found in other countries. Apart from this, the distinctions between comparative politics here and elsewhere are more matters of style and less matters of substance.  相似文献   
870.
Much of the rational choice literature suggests that constituency considerations will dominate decision-making when constituency concerns are pronounced and the issue is conducive to citizen audit. The 1990 House of Representatives vote on a constitutional amendment banning flag burning provides a good test of this argument. Drawing from a survey of legislators and polling data we argue that even in the face of salient constituency views legislators demonstrated a willingness to vote their policy views and cross their constituents. We explore how concerns about reputation and other considerations contributed to this phenomenon. We also suggest directions for future research.  相似文献   
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