Health insurance without provider influence: the limits of cost containment

In our previous paper, we showed that market forces can play a significant role in controlling health care costs and that a considerable amount of cost containment effort was pursued by third-party insurers in Oregon in the 1930s and 1940s. Although physicians were able to thwart this cost-control effort, a 1986 Supreme Court decision, FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, found that a boycott of insurers by dentists violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Further investigation of recent developments, including the recent Wickline v. California decision, indicates that the primary barriers to cost containment today are not obstructive tactics by providers or provider-controlled health insurance plans. Rather, the primary barriers are increases in the development and diffusion of new technology and society's apparent preference for paying for new tests and procedures regardless of economic efficiency.     

Nationalism,masculinity and multicultural citizenship in Serbia*

In Rossettiren obsesioa (Rossetti's Obsession), a short and explicitly meta-literary novel published in 2000, Ramon Saizarbitoria presents a Basque writer wrestling a formidable lover: the Spanish readership. The question that Eugenia, the woman from Madrid, constantly asks the writer, “¿Qué os pasa a los vascos?” (“What's wrong with you Basques?”), encapsulates the ambiguity of the relationship which unites these two indisputably allegorical characters. The difficult interaction between the powerful Spanish literary field and the emerging Basque literary field, doomed to coexist and moved by reciprocal feelings of fascination and irritation, becomes the novel's subject matter. Is translation – and its corollary, an access to a larger literary market – a pure and neutral instrument of liberation for the writer who expresses himself in a minority language, or could it become, in certain circumstances, a threat to his autonomy?     

Implications of Indeterminacy: Naturalism in Epistemology and the Philosophy of Law II

In a circulated but heretofore unpublished 2001 paper, I argued that Leiter’s analogy to Quine’s “naturalization of epistemology” does not do the philosophical work Leiter suggests. I revisit the issues in this new essay. I first show that Leiter’s replies to my arguments fail. Most significantly, if – contrary to the genuinely naturalistic reading of Quine that I advanced – Quine is understood as claiming that we have no vantage point from which to address whether belief in scientific theories is ever justified, it would not help Leiter’s parallel. Given Leiter’s way of drawing the parallel, the analogous position in the legal case would be not the Legal Realists’ indeterminacy thesis, but the very different position that we have no vantage point from which to address whether legal decisions can ever be justified. I then go on to address the more important question of whether the indeterminacy thesis, if true, would support any replacement of important legal philosophical questions with empirical ones. Although Ronald Dworkin has argued against the indeterminacy thesis, if he were wrong on this issue, it would not in any way suggest that the questions with which Dworkin is centrally concerned cannot fruitfully be addressed. The indeterminacy thesis is a bone of contention in an ordinary philosophical debate between its proponents and Dworkin. Of course, if the determinacy thesis were true, no one should try to show that it is false, but this triviality lends no support to the kind of replacement proposal that Leiter proposes. I conclude with some general reflections on naturalism and philosophical methodology.     

ASSOCIATION OF FAMILY AND CONCILIATION COURTS WHITE PAPER GUIDELINES FOR COURT‐INVOLVED THERAPY: A BEST PRACTICE APPROACH FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS

This article was written by the Honorable Linda S. Fidnick and Kelly. A. Koch, Esq. Judge Fidnick is an Associate Justice with the Hampshire Probate and Family Court. Prior to her appointment to the bench in 2008, Judge Fidnick was a partner in the Amherst law firm of Burres, Fidnick & Booth LLP, where she concentrated her practice in all areas of family law. Judge Fidnick is a graduate of Smith College and the University of Connecticut Law School, and she has been a member of the Massachusetts Bar for over thirty years. Judge Fidnick is past president of the Massachusetts chapter of the Association of Family and Conciliation Courts (AFCC) and currently serves on the national board of directors of AFCC. Judge Fidnick and Matthew Sullivan, Ph.D. are the co‐chairs of the AFCC Task Force on Court‐Involved Therapists. Attorney Koch is a graduate of Brandeis University and WesternNew England College School of Law. She served as a law clerk to the Justices of the Massachusetts Probate and Family Court and is presently an associate attorney with the Springfield, Massachusetts firm of Bulkley, Richardson and Gelinas. Matthew J. Sullivan, Ph.D. is a psychologist in private practice in California who has written articles, presented and done trainings at numerous national and international venues on interventions in high conflict divorce, Parenting Coordination and child alienation in family law cases. He currently serves on the Board of Directors at AFCC. Lyn R. Greenberg, Ph.D. is a family forensic psychologist practicing in Los Angeles, California. She serves as the reporter for the AFCC Court‐Involved Therapist Task Force and Co‐Chairs the Family Forensic Special Interest Group of Div. 43. She Co‐Chaired the APA‐ABA Working Group on Representation and Advocacy for Children. The AFCC Task Force on Court‐Involved Therapists was given the charge of defining guidelines for the professional practice of therapists working with court‐involved families. A draft of the Guidelines was presented for Comments in March 2010 and all comments were submitted to the Task Force Reporter, Lyn R. Greenberg, Ph.D. on May 1, 2010.     

Property Crime Victims' Decision to Notify the Police: Social,Cognitive, and Affective Determinants

Previous research suggests that 3 general processes underlie the decision of property crime victims to notify the police: One that is cognitively driven by reward/cost considerations, one that is affectively driven, and another that is socially driven. This study is the first to employ a community sample of crime victims to compare the 3 processes within a single study. Computer-assisted interviews were conducted with 422 property crime victims (n = 129 burglary, n = 293 theft) located via a random digit dialing procedure. Logistic regression analyses showed that each process independently accounted for a significant amount of the variance in victim reporting, and that there were no interactions among the three processes in predicting reporting. Of the 3 processes, social influence was the best predictor of reporting. Analysis of the affect-driven process showed that reporting was primarily a function of the level of fear rather than anger or the level of generalized arousal upon discovering the crime.