Revealed preferences for public goods: Applying a model of voter behavior

Most analyses of preferences for government-supplied goods disregard the fact that in a democratic society, these preferences are revealed by an individual choice: the vote. In this paper this is taken account of in a model, explaining the dynamics in voting behavior in a multi-party system. The model assumes that voters may be categorized into K groups of individuals, pursuing the same interests, who remember how parties do in representing these interests (given the level to which they are held responsible for government policy). The model allows one to estimate party identification, sensitiveness to economic performances, time preference, and relative preferences for public versus private goods, all for each of the groups. Furthermore, the model allows for an estimation of the level to which various parties are held responsible for government policies.An empirical application of the model to the Netherlands is presented, albeit that data restrictions did not allow a distinction of more than one group. The results in terms of significance of the coefficients as well as the interpretation of the original parameters are promising. The two main conclusions are that the relative preference for private versus collective consumption is lower than the existing ratio in the Netherlands, and that two parties forming a government coalition are not held equally responsible for the policies.     

The New German party finance law

In 1992 the Federal Constitutional Court decided for the sixth time since 1949 that the German legislation concerning political finance was unconstitutional. While the first five cases were important milestones in the development of German law on the public funding of parties and campaigns, this decision was notable for its rejection of key provisions of two laws that were passed in the 1980s and for overturning the Court's previous ban on direct aid to the parties. A commission of experts was formed to study and recommend changes, and a new law was passed by the Bundestag and Bundesrat in November and December 1993. Instead of focusing on reimbursements of parties for their campaign expenditures, the new law provides for direct financing of parties based on one DM for each vote in EU, national, and Land elections and DM .50 for each D‐Mark received in party dues and donations up to DM 6,000 per person (12,000 per couple). For the first five million votes, the parties receive DM 1.30 per vote. To encourage citizen involvement, parties are not to receive more than the sum of all of their own source revenues, and the total support for all parties is not to exceed the DM 230 million (adjusted for inflation) that was given to the parties as reimbursements for campaign expenditures in the period 1989–1992. To those who have followed the controversies over German political financing since the 1950s, it will be no surprise to learn that the new legislation has provoked criticism and sparked plans to bring the new law before the Federal Constitutional Court.     

Governance and Democracy in Northern Ireland: The Role of the Voluntary and Community Sector after the Agreement

Since 1998, Northern Ireland has been the subject of a unique experiment in governance and democracy. The experiment includes the establishment of a participatory Civic Forum in which the voluntary and community sector has an important stake. Beginning with a discussion of the merits of a participatory aspect to democracy in the contemporary age, this paper identifies factors that might help establish the Civic Forum as a successful participatory institution in Northern Ireland. Key factors include the attitude towards the Forum of political representatives and their willingness to foster a participatory dimension to the new democracy. Other important factors are inclusiveness and the balance of sectoral representation in the Forum.     

The Contentious American Debate: The First Amendment and Internet-based Hate Speech

This essay reviews the debate over what constitutes hate speech and whether or not such speech is protected by the American First Amendment. First, the concept of white racialism and white supremacy is defined and illustrated. Then after a brief discussion of the legal debate, the nature and problematic definition(s) of hate speech is presented. The unique speech environment of the internet is reviewed alongside attempts to limit and censor topics available on the internet. The arguments for and against restricting first amendment protection are discussed, with a focus on Michael Israel's five criteria for withdrawing first amendment protections. The work concludes with a discussion of the difficulty in constraining discourse on the internet.     

Is There a Dark Side to Government Supportfor Nonprofits?

The relationship between government social spending and private donations to the nonprofit sector is an issue that is relevant to both public administrators and nonprofit managers. Does government funding displace philanthropy, or encourage it? This article introduces the debate into the public administration literature. First, I survey and interpret the empirical work performed to date in this area by economists. Second, I retest this question across four nonprofit subsectors using data on both federal and state/local spending. My survey of the literature shows mixed results, although a broad pattern indicates that “crowding out” tends to dominate, particularly in the areas of social service provision and health. My empirical results are consistent with these findings, although they must be interpreted cautiously from a policy perspective: While results are statistically significant, the degree of crowding out is generally small. On the other hand, the claim that government funding stimulates giving seems to lack both statistical and policy significance.     

Sorting out the Seeking: The Economics of Individual Motivations

Various models of individual motivations are confronted with evidence from different kinds of laboratory experiments. The motivations distinguished are categorized as selfish, other regarding, or cooperative. The experimental evidence shows that the traditional, selfish model is too limited, but that the alternative models that have been suggested each have shortcomings of their own.