Australia and Scotland: the Evolution of a Long‐Distance Relationship1

Scotland's impact across the world undoubtedly stretched to the Antipodes particularly, but not only, in the colonial era. Under the “canopy of Empire”, Australia and Scotland were linked by migration, trade, capital movements and by cultural ties. But these were all two‐way ties. They did not simply colour the “Australian civilisation”. Rather there was a vital and shifting reciprocation between Scotland and Australia. The relationship between them has mainly been determined by their different economic trajectories. Today financial and skilled human capital move each way between the two countries with heightened velocity and efficiency. These flows, along with continuing cultural connections, enmesh two fully developed modern economies.     

Learning the Limits of Power: Privatization and State-Labor Interactions in Mexico

Despite repeated conflict with organized labor, the government of Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–94) pushed an aggressive divestment agenda that transformed Mexico into Latin America's leading privatizer. Explanations of Salinas's achievements typically emphasize centralized presidential power (including control over the ruling party) and autonomy; technocratic and political savvy; and weak labor opposition. This article questions such a pure "capacity-outcome" approach. Of equal importance are the learning effects of repeated interaction between the state and labor, which changed the course of divestment struggles and thereby influenced their outcomes. Lessons learned in successive confrontations led to patterns of interaction conducive to widescale privatization. The article develops this argument through comparative analysis of major divestment episodes in the aviation, mining, steel, and telecommunications sectors.     

Do Elections Always Motivate Incumbents? Learning vs. Re-Election Concerns

This paper studies a principal-agent model of the relationship between office-holder and an electorate, where everyone is initially uninformed about the office-holder’s ability. If office-holder effort and ability interact in the determination of performance in office, then an office-holder has an incentive to learn, i.e., raise effort so that performance becomes a more accurate signal of her ability. Elections reduce the learning effect, and the reduction in this effect may more than offset the positive “re-election concerns” effect of elections on effort, implying higher effort with appointment. When this occurs, appointment of officials may welfare-dominate elections.