The Historical Context of Small Claims Courts

The conception of simple, informal, lawyerless courts where ordinary people can settle their affairs amicably without expense, delay, technicality, or contentiousness has fascinated Americans since colonial times. This theme can be seen running through the movements to codify the law, simplify legal procedure, open the practice of law to Everyman, create conciliation courts; the creation of the small claims courts and administrative tribunals; and attempts in the 1960s and 1970s to divert small matters out of the courts altogether and into Neighborhood Justice Centers and other informal dispute resolution mechanisms. The long and complex history of reform has been characterized by cyclical shifts in emphasis between two principal modes of characterizing small claims. One mode characterizes small claims as petty private quarrels and has led to attempts to supply justice by aiding fair outcomes between the particular parties. Since no broader social impact of the dispute is seen, the most efficient possible individual level response is viewed as appropriate. The other mode perceives small claims as particular instances of important systematic injustices between social groups or classes and has led to attempts to use small claims processing as the forum for making important policy. Perceiving broad social impact of the resolution of small claims, one will see a mobilization of aggregate resources to deal with them as important social problems as appropriate. As a result, entire classes of cases and issues may be skimmed off and dealt with collectively as important social-legal problems. When this occurs the perception of the small claims that remain shifts to the other mode, and they are viewed as less important residual petty quarrels meriting less attention and resources. This periodic skimming off of certain claims and waning of collective attention to the remaining mass of claims has introduced a cyclical element into the development of small claims courts (and other legal reforms). Thus the mode of preceiving small claims itself conditions the mode of legal response which is advocated.     

The U.K. overseas development administration and non-departmental public bodies in the field of educational aid

The educational aid programme sponsored by the U.K. Overseas Development Administration has been conducted using organizations in which substantial changes have been made in the last ten years. This article analyses the changes in the structure of non-departmental agencies and in the relations between the Overseas Development Administration and the agencies, and considers the rationale for these. It draws attention to the contrast between the formal independence of these non-departmental bodies and continuing departmental control, and to the limitations of non-departmental bodies as a means of securing advice and co-operation. The article points to the difficulties in organizational terms of marrying the aim of providing a framework for co-operating with the recipients of aid, and for securing advice, co-operation and support in its administration from bodies outside central government in the U.K., while preserving ministerial responsibility.     

Punishment or treatment?

Although there is strong support among the general public for providing insanity acquittees with mental health treatment, it is also believed that insanity acquittees should be punished when they break the law. Prior studies of the lengths of confinement of insanity acquittees have yielded inconsistent results. This article draws upon a large-scale, multistate study of insanity pleas to explore the question: Is society able to withhold punishment against persons acquitted of criminal charges due to insanity? Results indicate that offense seriousness is a more important factor than mental disorder in determining the lengths of confinement of persons foundNot Guilty by Reason of Insanity and that persons found guilty are more likely to be released without ever having been confined than persons acquited by reason of insanity. Implications for invoking offense seriousness as a primary criterion in assessments of dangerousness are discussed.