Bribing Voters

We present a model of influence over collective decisions made through voting. We show how an outside party offering incentives to a committee can manipulate the committee's decisions at no cost and induce inefficient outcomes. A key condition is that the outsider be able to reward decisive votes differently. Inefficiency results from voting externalities. We relax all initial assumptions to investigate how to insulate committees. We study different information settings, credibility assumptions, payoff structures (voters caring about the collective decision and about their own votes), and incentive schemes (offers contingent on pivotal votes, individual votes, vote shares, and the collective decision). We analyze when voting should be made secret; we elucidate the role of individual accountability and various political institutions in preventing vote buying. We discuss implications for lobbying, for clientelism, for decisions in legislatures, boards, and central banks, and for the efficiency of democracy .     

An Unusual Case Showing Fatal Rupture of a Gastric Ulcer or Gastromalacia? The Importance/Role of Histology for Differential Diagnosis

Gastromalacia is the acute autolytic erosion of the gastric wall. It generally occurs postmortem, and it appears as a slimy brownish black region of the wall which occurs principally in the gastric fundus. A 59‐year‐old woman died in the Emergency Department following a 2‐day period of mild abdominal pain, vomiting, and diarrhea. A forensic autopsy was performed which revealed a rupture of the gastric fundus that had caused leakage of gastric content into the abdominal cavity. There was no macroscopic evidence of peritonitis, and the stomach wall adjacent to the rupture site showed marked thinning. The gross appearance was typical of gastromalacia. In contrast, histological observations revealed the presence of an ulcer at the site of perforation and a severe acute inflammatory reaction indicating a robust reaction with an antemortem rupture.