Identifying the cutoff score for the PCL-R scale (psychopathy checklist-revised) in a Brazilian forensic population

This study introduces a Portuguese-language version of psychopathy checklist-revised (PCL-R) [Harv. Mental Health Lett. 12 (1995) 4] in the Brazilian penitentiary system. Hare's scale is used extensively in many other countries. In a forensic population sample of 56 male subjects classified as psychopaths and non-psychopaths [Manual for the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, Multi-Health System, Toronto, 1991], 33 correlated to global personality disorder (GPD) and 23 to partial personality disorder (PPD), respectively, subtypes of antisocial personality disorder [Manual for the Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised, Multi-Health System, Toronto, 1991]. Subjects were evaluated through psychiatric and neurological examinations, review of judicial records, Rorschach and PCL-R. A control group of 30 subjects without criminological or psychiatric history was also evaluated with the same instruments. PCL-R validation and identification of cutoff score for Psychopathy (GPD group) was assessed through the concurrent use of the Rorschach. PCL-R cutoff score for the Brazilian population was set at 23. Sensitivity was determined at 84.8%, and reliability was high (Kappa index = 0.87). GPD individuals were characterized as clearly psychopathic according to PCL-R criteria while PPD individuals can only be considered mildly psychopathic, with better chance of rehabilitation.     

New perspectives on crime,violence and insecurity in Latin America

This article introduces a Crime, Law & Social Change special issue on rethinking organised crime, collective violence and insecurity in contemporary Latin America. The five contributions, which among them cover the cases of Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala and Mexico, address the puzzle of why and how in the midst of the world’s most serious crime and violence crisis ‘stability’ and ‘political order’ are nonetheless maintained. Taking a critical distance to conventional scholarship on these problems, the present collection of papers shifts the focus from one on how democratic regimes and formal institutions of the state are affected to a broader one that puts the spotlight on the ‘real politics’ and ‘real governance’ of crime and violence in the region. Cultural aspects of the ‘collapse of legality’, the holding power of informal institutions and the workings of ‘crimilegal orders’ and ‘criminalized electoral politics’ are explored through variegated conceptual and methodological approaches drawn from political science, criminology, sociology, social psychology, cultural studies and investigative journalism.     

A Hard-to- Escape Situation Informal Pacts,Kingpin Strategies,and Collective Violence in Mexico

Mexico has for an extended period been experiencing homicide rates above, or close to, epidemic levels. Instead of examining why formal institutional reform geared at strengthening democracy has not helped to foment peace and security, as most of the research on collective violence in Latin America and the Caribbean does, this paper focuses on the gap between formal and informal institutions, and continuities rather than points of rupture. I argue that in Mexico, there is a gap between formal institutions (which define how the country should be) and informal institutions (which constrain actual strategic choices). I apply a path-dependence approach to examine what factors have been reproducing collective violence over time, finding that the prevalence of protection rackets (operated by non-state actors at the subnational level) and the use of kingpin strategies (both by state and non-state actors) explain collective violence in the past but also in the present. In the past decades, informal pacts and kingpin strategies have changed in Mexico, but they have survived and adapted to the new formally democratic institutional setting. For the period 1989-2017, I identify three critical junctures that changed the rules of the game, four mechanisms of inertia, and two factors of lock-in that make it difficult to reduce collective violence.