STRATEGY,STRUCTURE AND PROCESS IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A TEST OF THE MILES AND SNOW MODEL

We present a comprehensive empirical application of the Miles and Snow (1978) model of organizational strategy, structure and process to the public sector. We refine the model by distinguishing between strategy formulation and implementation, and applying it to 90 public service organizations. Although the empirical evidence shows that organizational strategies fit the Miles and Snow categories of prospector, defender and reactor, the relationship between these strategies and organizational structures (for example, centralization) and processes (for example, planning) is less consistent with their model. Conclusions are drawn for public management theory and practice.     

Crisis Is Endemic to the Financial System

As British Prime Minister Gordon Brown notes in this section, we are witnessing the birth pangs of a new global order in this deepest financial and economic crash since the Great Depression. There will be plenty of pain all around for a while. And when the quarter-century leveraged-debt bubble of the United States—the explosion of which detonated the crash—is finally unwound, the new global balance will favor an Asia flush with cash. The G-20 will replace the G-7 as the executive committee of globalization. And, if wise leadership stays the course, there will be a "green lining" to the recovery as the fiscal stimulus is imbued with an environmental sensibility.     

The time inconsistency of long constitutions: Evidence from the world

This article analyses the mechanisms establishing time consistency of constitutions. It explains why shorter and more locked constitutions are more likely to be time consistent (change less) and that long constitutions are more time inconsistent (change more, despite locking). Empirical evidence from all of the democratic countries in the world indicates that the length and locking of constitutions are not independent criteria, and that their combination leads to less time consistency. To address this inter‐relationship, a measure of time inconsistency (a combination of locking and amendment rate) is developed and it is demonstrated that it is connected with the length of constitutions. The article shows how time inconsistency is incompatible with theories of ‘constitutional amendment culture’ not only at the theoretical level, but also empirically. Finally, the article proves that the empirical finding that the length of constitutions is related to lower per capita income and higher corruption are not only in agreement with time inconsistency arguments, but this also extends beyond OECD countries to all democracies.     

A rising generation of Europeans? Revisited

The EJPR article ‘A rising generation of Europeans?’ provided systematic evidence for the existence of generational differences in attitudes towards the European Union (EU). In this research note, it is argued that identifying generational differences in specifically affective orientations is the crucial issue for the future of the EU. Drawing on and extending the earlier work expectations in respect to generational and life‐cycle differences in affective orientations are developed and tested, highlighting the existence of the former, their consistency across a range of indicators, and the absence of the latter. The results are an important counterpoint to the growth in ambivalence in attitudes towards the EU.     

CAN RATIONAL CHOICE BE CONSIDERED A GENERAL THEORY OF CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL‐LEVEL PANEL DATA

In the last few decades, rational choice theory has emerged as a bedrock theory in the fields of economics, sociology, psychology, and political science. Although rational choice theory has been available to criminologists for many years now, the field has not embraced it as other disciplines have. Moreover, rational choice scholars have fueled this skepticism of the theory's generality by modeling offender decision making that is one‐sided—large on the costs of crime (sanction threats), short on the benefits of crime. In this article, we directly assess the generality of rational choice theory by examining a fully specified model in a population that is often presumed to be less rational—adolescents from lower socioeconomic families who commit both instrumental (property) and expressive crimes (violence/drugs). By using a panel of N = 1,354 individuals, we find that offending behavior is consistent with rational responses to changes in the perceived costs and benefits of crime even after eliminating fixed unobserved heterogeneity and other time‐varying confounders, and these results are robust across different subgroups. The findings support our argument that rational choice theory is a general theory of crime.