Learning and Opinion Change, Not Priming: Reconsidering the Priming Hypothesis

According to numerous studies, campaign and news media messages can alter the importance individuals place on an issue when evaluating politicians, an effect called priming. Research on priming revived scholarly interest in campaign and media effects and implied, according to some, that campaigns and the media can manipulate voters. There are, however, alternative explanations for these priming findings, alternatives that previous studies have not fully considered. In this article, I reanalyze four cases of alleged priming, using panel data to test priming effects against these alternatives. Across these four cases, I find little evidence of priming effects. Instead, campaign and media attention to an issue creates the appearance of priming through a two-part process: Exposing individuals to campaign and media messages on an issue (1) informs some of them about the parties' or candidates' positions on that issue. Once informed, (2) these individuals often adopt their preferred party's or candidate's position as their own.     

Politische Soziologie in Deutschland — Forschungsfelder, Analyseperspektiven, ausgewählte empirische Befunde

This paper provides an overview of the state of the art in the field of Political Sociology in Germany. It turns out that Political Sociology has been established as an independent sub-discipline in Political Science. The theoretical approaches predominantly follow an empirical-analytical perspective. In terms of methodology, a quantitative approach is prevailing. The number of research fields has significantly broadened. Major research topics are: democracy and the transformation of political systems, political parties, political participation and voting behaviour, political values and attitudes, political communication.     

Between policy and reality: multiculturalism, the second generation, and the third space in Britain

Despite the significant level of cultural diversity that exists in contemporary Europe as a consequence of immigration and diaspora, state policies on multiculturalism in several countries have not kept pace with the complex and dynamic processes created by these pluralising social forces and realities. This has given rise to exclusionary contexts that have led to feelings of alienation by immigrant communities. In Britain, the violent street confrontations in Bradford in 2001 and the London bombings of 2005 both epitomised, as well as were outcomes of, the British nation state’s failure to foster dialogue and a sense of inclusion among these communities. Foregrounding the extent of the grievances and frustrations prevalent in British society, these social disturbances have also contributed to renewed debates on issues of national identity, belonging, and multiculturalism. More importantly, these clashes, involving mostly the second-generation British Asian Muslim community, have brought to the fore the dissonance between assumptions of belonging underlying “state multiculturalism”, which moves to fix and stabilise identities, and those that inform the complex processes of identification and constructions of the “third space” of belonging by racialised minority communities. Focusing on Britain, this paper’s central hypothesis is that official multiculturalism has failed to take into account the fluid and heterogeneous frames in and through which second-generation British Asians ground their cultural and political identities and demands. As many of the nation states in Europe are today, like Britain, multiethnic in composition with expanding Asian communities, how successfully or not Britain modifies its integration policies with respect to the presence of minorities of immigrant origin has enormous implications not only for Europe but also for Asia and Asia–Europe relations.     

The Impact of the Economy on Presidential Elections Throughout US History

Political Behavior - As numerous studies in the US and elsewhere document, voters often hold incumbents accountable for recent economic circumstances. However, our knowledge of the conditions that...     

Predictive Crime Mapping: Arbitrary Grids or Street Networks?

Objectives

Decades of empirical research demonstrate that crime is concentrated at a range of spatial scales, including street segments. Further, the degree of clustering at particular geographic units remains noticeably stable and consistent; a finding that Weisburd (Criminology 53:133–157, 2015) has recently termed the ‘law of crime concentration at places’. Such findings suggest that the future locations of crime should—to some extent at least—be predictable. To date, methods of forecasting where crime is most likely to next occur have focused either on area-level or grid-based predictions. No studies of which we are aware have developed and tested the accuracy of methods for predicting the future risk of crime at the street segment level. This is surprising given that it is at this level of place that many crimes are committed and policing resources are deployed.

Methods

Using data for property crimes for a large UK metropolitan police force area, we introduce and calibrate a network-based version of prospective crime mapping [e.g. Bowers et al. (Br J Criminol 44:641–658, 2004)], and compare its performance against grid-based alternatives. We also examine how measures of predictive accuracy can be translated to the network context, and show how differences in performance between the two cases can be quantified and tested.

Results

Findings demonstrate that the calibrated network-based model substantially outperforms a grid-based alternative in terms of predictive accuracy, with, for example, approximately 20 % more crime identified at a coverage level of 5 %. The improvement in accuracy is highly statistically significant at all coverage levels tested (from 1 to 10 %).

Conclusions

This study suggests that, for property crime at least, network-based methods of crime forecasting are likely to outperform grid-based alternatives, and hence should be used in operational policing. More sophisticated variations of the model tested are possible and should be developed and tested in future research.

     

Voter Learning in State Primary Elections

When voters learn about candidates' issue positions during election campaigns, does it affect how they vote? This basic question about voters remains unanswered in part because of a methodological obstacle: learning candidates' issue positions may influence not only voters' vote choice but also their issue positions. To surmount this obstacle, we attempt to answer this question by examining statewide primary elections, which are arguably less vulnerable to this reverse causation problem because they lack partisan cues and are of much lower salience than presidential elections. Using both existing polling data and our own panel Internet surveys, we find that voters learn about the ideologies of candidates during statewide primary campaigns and that this learning affects their voting decisions in senate and gubernatorial primaries. We fail to find similar results for down‐ballot primaries, raising questions about voters' ability to make informed judgments for these types of elections.     

Do Open Primaries Improve Representation? An Experimental Test of California's 2012 Top‐Two Primary

To improve representation and alleviate polarization among US lawmakers, many have promoted open primaries—allowing voters to choose candidates from any party—but the evidence that this reform works is mixed. To determine whether open primaries lead voters to choose ideologically proximate candidates, we conducted a statewide experiment just before California's 2012 primaries, the first conducted under a new top‐two format. We find that voters failed to distinguish moderate and extreme candidates. As a consequence, voters actually chose more ideologically distant candidates on the new ballot, and the reform failed to improve the fortunes of moderate congressional and state senate candidates.