Tissue distribution of lidocaine after fatal accidental injection

The accidental death of a 64-year-old heart patient as a result of the injection of an incorrect dose of lidocaine is presented. The attending nurse inadvertently administered an intravenous bolus of 10 mL of 20% lidocaine (2g). The patient should have received 5 mL of 2% lidocaine (0.1 g). Such iatrogenic overdoses of lidocaine arise from confusion between prepackaged dosage forms. Lidocaine concentrations (mg/L or mg/kg were: blood, 30; brain, 135; heart, 106; kidney, 204; lung, 89; spleen, 115; skeletal muscle, 20; and adipose, 1.3. The results indicate that even during cardiopulmonary resuscitation as much as 38% of the administered dose of lidocaine may be found in poorly perfused tissue such as skeletal muscle and adipose.     

The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties and its Contribution to International Criminal Justice After World War II

This article traces the evolution of discussions within the Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties and the United Nations War Crimes Commission regarding the establishment of an international criminal court. The Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties was the first war crimes commission that seriously debated establishing an international criminal court for the prosecution of war criminals. Following the discussions held in the UNWCC, the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg was created. All three institutions played a major part in the development of international criminal law.     

The economy,corruption, and the vote: Evidence from experiments in Sweden and Moldova

How does corruption affect voting behavior when economic conditions are poor? Using a novel experimental design and two original survey experiments, we offer four important conclusions. First, in a low corruption country (Sweden), voters react negatively to corruption regardless of the state of the economy. Second, in a high corruption country (Moldova), voters react negatively to corruption only when the state of the economy is also poor; when economic conditions are good, corruption is less important. Third, respondents in Sweden react more strongly to corruption stimuli than respondents in Moldova. Finally, in the low corruption country, sociotropic corruption voting (or voting based on corruption among political leaders) is relatively more important, whereas in our high corruption country, pocketbook corruption voting (or voting based on one's own personal experience with corruption, i.e., being asked to pay bribes) is equally prevalent. Our findings are consistent with multiple stable corruption equilibria, as well as with a world where voters are more responsive to corruption signals more common in their environment.     

People Power or a One‐Shot Deal? A Dynamic Model of Protest

In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, a crucial question is whether popular protest is now likely to be a permanent part of Middle Eastern politics or if the protests that have taken place over the past two years are more likely to be a “one‐shot deal.” We consider this question from a theoretical perspective, focusing on the relationship between the consequences of protests in one period and the incentives to protest in the future. The model provides numerous predictions for why we might observe a phenomenon that we call the “one‐shot deal”: when protest occurs at one time but not in the future despite an intervening period of bad governance. The analysis focuses on the learning process of citizens. We suggest that citizens may not only be discovering the type or quality of their new government—as most previous models of adverse selection assume—but rather citizens may also be learning about the universe of potential governments in their country. In this way, bad performance by one government induces some pessimism about possible replacements. This modeling approach expands the formal literature on adverse selection in elections in two ways: it takes seriously the fact that removing governments can be costly, and it explores the relevance of allowing the citizen/principal to face uncertainty about the underlying distribution from which possible government/agent types are drawn.     

Who's Running the Road? Street Railway Strikes and the Problem of Constructing a Liberal Capitalist Order in Canada, 1886–1914

Street railway strikes in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were frequently the occasion for large-scale collective violence in North American cities and challenged the capacity of local authorities to maintain civic order. However, this was only the most visible manifestation of the challenge that street railway workers' collective action posed to the order of liberal capitalism, an order constructed on several intersecting dimensions. Using the example of Canadian street railway workers from 1886 to 1914, a period of rapid urbanization and industrialization, this article explores the ways the collective action by workers and their community sympathizers challenged the workplace, marketplace, and “streetplace” orders of liberal capitalism. It discusses how those challenges were met through political and legal processes of resistance and accommodation, taking into account the fragmentation of state power, hostile public opinion toward the street railways, and conflicting views over the legitimate scope for workers' collective action.