Bribing votes: A new explanation to the ``inequality-redistribution' puzzle in LDC's

The recent empirical literature on redistribution and developmentemphasizes two main evidences: (i) more redistribution generallyinduces higher growth rates and (ii) more inequality does notnecessarily increase the political demand for redistribution.These stylized facts are at odds with the correlations observedin developed countries. Several theoretical arguments can beadvanced to explain these puzzles. In this paper, it is shownthat ``vote purchases'' may be seen as an additional argument toexplain puzzle (ii). We formalize this idea and examine theconditions under which vote bribes may be an obstacle toredistribution (and thus to growth) in a developing economy.     

The Value-Added Tax in Ghana

Ghana's Parliament enacted a value-added tax (VAT) in December 1994, with collection to begin on March 1, 1995. The short preparation period proved fatal for the tax. However, the nation's fiscal problems continue and the government is resolved to reintroduce the tax in 1998. This article reviews the structure of the failed tax, showing how it would have been a more effective general consumption tax than the system it would have replaced, examines the reasons for its untimely demise, and considers prospects for a successful reintroduction of the tax. Ghana's experience with the VAT can hold important lessons for countries contemplating the introduction of such a tax.     

莫言,对中国当代社会的苦涩批判(英文)

莫言的中文意思是不说话,但实际上他的小说具有比一般讲故事的小说更具有震撼力。他的小说《酒国》以一种多视角的形式展现象征意义上的现实,让读者能够多视角地去解读中国的社会现实。     

Rebel-to-political and back? Hamas as a security provider in Gaza between rebellion,politics and governance

ABSTRACT

After winning the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections and subsequently taking control of the Gaza Strip in the summer of 2007, the Palestinian Hamas – a hybrid political, social and military actor – undertook a complex process to ascertain authority and control over Gaza. The article focuses on understanding Hamas’s performance as a political party and a “rebel government” as well as the impact of this newly acquired role on the group’s strategy. Relying on primary sources, field-work and interviews with members of the Hamas government and its security sector, the study looks at Hamas’s role as a security provider and analyses the complex relationship between the institutionalized security sector and the group’s insurgent armed wing. Examining Hamas’s logic as a security provider and exploring the inherent tensions between political and insurgent logics allows for a better understanding of both the rebel group’s role as a political actor and the broader challenges behind the successful rebel-to-political transformations of non-state armed organizations. In doing so it contributes to the emerging literature on non-state actors’ shifts between ballots and bullets and on their potential role as alternative governance providers.