Calling the cops: Police telephone operators and citizen calls for service

Citizen calls for police service represent direct demands on government. It is the job of police phone operators to translate these demands into official, bureaucratically recognized inputs. As “street-level” bureaucrats, police phone operators enjoy considerable discretion in how they recieve, process, and transmit information. Operators screen all calls, categorize the citizen's problem, and by that process they determine much of the initial police response to that call. This article analyzes data on citizen requests and operator responses coded from a sample of over 26,000 phone calls to police in 21 jurisdictions in three metropolitan areas. The data indicate that most citizen calls to police involve the provision of information or assistance, nuisance abatement, traffic problems, or the regulation of interpersonal disputes. Citizen calls cover a wide range of topics, but only about 20 percent involve predatory crime of any type. The typical operator response to the problems described by most citizens was to promise the dispatch of a patrol unit, although this varied by problem type and by the apparent seriousness of the call. Complaint operators seem to follow a decision rule that a patrol unit will always be sent to the scene except in those situations where it is clear that none is needed. The article concludes with a discussion of the possible impact of operator demeanor on policy-community relations.     

Police managers and their perceptions of higher education

The authors investigate beliefs held by police chiefs pertinent to higher education in the United States. Three distinct attitude patterns are derived empirically, which have implications for recruitment, promotion and staffing assignment processes within police departments, as well as implications for law enforcement education. The recommendations of the 1967 President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice are evaluated in light of the findings.     

Bureaucratic Power and Public Policies: a Test of the Rational Staff Maximization Hypothesis

This paper tests the staff maximization hypothesis that bureaucratic power is positively related to labour inputs to the production of public sector goods and services. The context of the test is the staffing policies of three groups of British local authorities in three time periods. The relationship between bureaucratic power and changes in authorities' staff is estimated while controlling for the influence of local party politics, central grants and conditions in the environment of the local political system. The results of the statistical analysis refute the staff maximization hypothesis.     

Cost Containment in a Public-Private Health Care System: The Case of Italy

Health care cost containment has become an important issue in Western countries in recent years. However, most efforts have met with only limited success and Italy is no exception. This article examines the mixed public-private system existing in Italy. It also describes and evaluates cost-containment efforts in the Italian public health care system.     

Contributors to this issue

Contributors to this issue