Callous and unemotional traits and social cognitive processes in a sample of community-based aggressive youth

Psychopathic traits are associated with violent, aggressive behaviors and recidivism in adulthood. To increase positive treatment outcomes, it is arguably beneficial to identify and treat psychopathy as early as possible. Furthermore, because research shows that the effectiveness of behavior modification is likely to be affected by the social information-processing patterns of aggressive children, it is important to understand the relationship between conduct-disordered traits and social cognitions. The results of this study showed that callous/unemotional traits in a community-based sample of behavior-disordered youth (57 male, 19 female; 10-19 years of age; 63% African American) significantly predicted values in obtaining a tangible reward and getting into trouble or being punished. However, callous/unemotional traits, impulsivity/conduct problems, and narcissism failed to predict positive expectations regarding receiving a tangible reward, reducing aversive treatment, and demonstration of dominance. Implications for these results are presented.     

THE PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION: SOME SEMIOTIC AND CULTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Abstract: Guidelines for government communication fail to acknowledge that they express a particular model of communication—a Process model—and that other models of communication exist which imply different communication strategies. This article discusses the practical and conceptual limitations of the Process model of communication, outlines alternative models from Semiotics and from Cultural Studies, and considers the communication strategies which each one offers to governments. The article draws on a recent study of the controversy surrounding the Australian federal government's Quality Improvement and Accreditation scheme for child care.     

Collective decision making by committee

Implicitly or explicitly, economic decisions always contain elements of compromise. However, the bargaining models of economic theory treat only the two decision maker case with linearly aggregated priorities; i.e. compromise decisions under Pareto optimality and no side payments. Even then the relative importance of the decision makers remains indeterminate. This paper proposes a simplified bargaining model with three new features: (a) it allows multiple participants; (b) it uses optimal voting patterns to combine the policy proposals, rather than the policy priorities, to form those compromise decisions; and (c) it determines the relative power of each participant endogenously. Perhaps more important, the method does not depend on each decision maker knowing the preferences of his colleagues exactly.