Fiscal Federalism for Emerging Economies: Lessons from Switzerland?

Switzerland is one of the most non-centralized countries inthe world. A groining literature is examining the economic effectsof tax competition between the 26 Swiss cantons. Despite therelative success of Swiss federalism, most federal countriesfollow the principles of coordinated rather than competitivefederalism. We identify the institutional preconditions forwell-functioning competitive federalism in Switzerland. Thesecond part deals with the applicability of the Swiss experiencefor emerging economies in Latin America. The analysis recognizesthat most institutions identified to be crucial in the Swisscase are missing in Latin America. This leads to the policyconclusion that competitive federalism can only produce itspositive effects under certain institutional circumstances.These circumstances are often not considered when introducinglax competition in emerging economies.     

Strategic Misspecification in Regression Models

Common regression models are often structurally inconsistent with strategic interaction. We demonstrate that this "strategic misspecification" is really an issue of structural (or functional form) misspecification. The misspecification can be equivalently written as a form of omitted variable bias, where the omitted variables are nonlinear terms arising from the players' expected utility calculations and often from data aggregation. We characterize the extent of the specification error in terms of model parameters and the data and show that typical regressions models can at times give exactly the opposite inferences versus the true strategic data-generating process. Researchers are recommended to pay closer attention to their theoretical models, the implications of those models concerning their statistical models, and vice versa.     

Government Strength, Power Dispersion in Governments and Budget Deficits in OECD-Countries. A Voting Power Approach

We test for the influenceof government strength and dispersion ofpower among the parties of coalitiongovernments on the size of annual debtaccumulation through budget deficits inOECD-countries from 1970 to 1999.Government strength and power dispersion incoalition governments are measured by theBanzhaf index of voting power, respectivelythe standard deviation of Banzhaf indicesof coalition parties. We believe that theseare better-suited proxies than most of whathas been applied so far. Governmentstrength turns out to be insignificant.However, coalitions with equally strongpartners run significantly higher deficitsthan coalitions with one dominating party.     

Different methodologies in the assessment of identity: Congruence between self-report and interview techniques?

Convergent-divergent validity and reliability estimates for clinical interview and self-report measures of ego identity were obtained. Twenty-three males and 25 females completed an extended version of the Ego Identity Interview [H. D. Grotevant, W. Thorebecke, and M. C. Meyer (1982) An Extension of Marcia's Identity Status Interview into the Interpersonal Domain,Journal of Youth and Adolescence 11: 33–48] and the extended version of the Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status [H. D. Grotevant and G. R. Adams (1984) Development of an Objective Measure to Assess Ego-Identity in Adolescence: Validation and Replication,Journal of Youth and Adolescence, 13: 419–438]. While the two measures were expected to converge, little convergence was observed. The findings suggest that the two measures may be (a) assessing relatively distinct forms of ego identity, or (b) that the ego-identity construct as measured by the process (exploration) and outcome (commitment) dimensions needs further theoretical examination.Partial support for this project was provided through fundings to the second author from the Utah State Agricultural Experiment Station, Logan, Utah. This paper was presented earlier in a symposium titled Identity Development from Adolescence to Adulthood at the biennial meetings of the Society for Research on Child Development, Toronto, Canada, April 1985.Received M.S degree in Psychology from Utah State University. Research interests include identity development and social relations.Received Ph.D. from the Pennsylvania State University in 1975. Research interests include personality and social development in adolescence, family psychology, and research methodology.     

Field experiments on the competitiveness of males carrying genetic control systems for Aedes aegypti

The competitiveness carrying males of three genetic control systems forAedes aegypti (L.), viz. chemosterilized males, double translocation heterozygote males (T1T3) and distorter double translocation heterozygote males (DT1T3), released into a natural population in the Delhi metropolitanxarea was evaluated using a method based on the principle of release and recapture of marked females. Chemosterilized males and DT1T3 males showed approximately normal competitiveness in the field which is similar to the results obtained from laboratory and field cage experiments. The T1T3 males were found to have reduced competitiveness both in the field and laboratory cage tests, in contrast to previously reported results with unmarked T1T3 males in field cages. The cause of this reduction in competitiveness was not clear.

---

Zusammenfassung Es wurde die Konkurrenzkraft vonAedes aegypti — M?nnchen ermittelt nach Anwendung von drei genetischen Verfahren, n?mlich Chemosterilisation der M?nnchen, heterozygote doppelte Translokation (T1T3) und gest?rte doppelte heterozygote Translokation (DT1T3) der M?nnchen, die in eine natürliche Population des hauptst?dtischen Gebiets von Delhi freigelassen wurden; dabei wurde eine auf dem Prinzip des Freilassens und Wiederfangs von markierten Weibchen beruhende Methode verwendet. Chemosterilisierte und DT1T3 — M?nnchen zeigten ann?hernd normale Konkurrenzkraft, was den Ergebnissen von Labor- und Freilandk?figversuchen entspricht. Die T1T3-M?nnchen zeigten verminderte Konkurrenzkraft im Feld und in Labork?figtests, im Gegensatz zu früher berichteten Befunden mit nicht-markierten T1T3-M?nnchen in Feldk?figen. Die Ursache dieser Reduktion der Konkurrenzkraft war nicht klar.

     

Economic Freedom,Government Policy and the Trade-Off Between Equity and Economic Growth

This study investigates the role that economicfreedom plays in economic growth and in the distribution in marketincome, the role of government policy in advancingeconomic progress and in promoting income equality, and the effectthat the rate of economic progress has on thedistribution of market income. Structural and reduced formmodels are estimated that reveal that economic freedompromotes both economic growth and equity, and that there is apositive but relatively small trade-off between growth andincome inequality.     

Preface

Law and Philosophy -