Moral Courage: A Sociological Perspective

While many social scientists have written about obedience and conformity, few have analyzed the conduct of outliers and nonconformists who defy these forces by engaging in acts of moral courage. Among psychologists and philosophers, moral courage is often portrayed as an individualistic phenomenon that is immune to sociological analysis. This paper challenges this view, positing that social ties with like-minded coconspirators, an identification with ‘imagined others’ who espouse similar moral beliefs, and social interactions that awaken the conscience play a crucial role in facilitating these seemingly solitary acts. Drawing on two original case studies – a border guard who defied a restrictive immigration law on the eve of World War II, and a Serb who crossed the lines of ethnic division during the Balkan wars of the 1990s – the article illuminates the social dimensions of moral courage and contributes to the project of developing a social psychology of conscience.     

Iraq—managing the peace

In a little over three weeks in March and April 2003 American-led Coalition forces invaded Iraq, defeated the Iraqi Armed Forces, removed Saddam Hussein's regime and occupied a country the size of France. In terms of military power and political will, it was a display of extraordinary detemination and might. To have achieved it in such a short time, with almost negligible military casualties and with limited war damage to the country's infrastructure was a feat of almost unimaginable military precision and planning. To have further avoided the dire consequences of the much talked of 'Stalingrad scenario' in and around the built-up areas of Baghdad and Basra displayed maturity and wisdom in the senior military leadership. That conditions for success were set, irrespective of outside pressures to act, is both commendable and surprising in a time of instant news, instant reaction and demands for instant success.     

A fatal case of oral ingestion of methanol. Distribution in postmortem tissues and fluids including pericardial fluid and vitreous humor.

A 41-year-old man ingested orally a large quantity of methanol and was found dead at home. The presence of methanol in body fluids and tissues was determined by head-space gas chromatography. The blood ethanol and acetone were negative. Tissue distribution of methanol showed that the kidney presented the highest content of methanol (5.13 g/kg) followed by liver (4.18 g/kg), vitreous humor (3.96 g/l), heart (3.45 g/kg), urine (3.43 g/l), pericardial fluid (3.29 g/l), blood (2.84 g/l) and finally stomach content (2.21 g/l).     

Sibling Abuse in Nature and Culture

This essay reflects on an article by Katy Butler in the Science Section of the New York Times of February 28, 2006. It argues that Butler discusses sibling abuse mainly as a biologically rooted phenomenon and does not clarify its social sources and dynamics. The essay presents the social causes of sibling abuse and suggests approaches toward its short‐term reduction and long‐term prevention.     

Ambiguous political power and contest efforts

When there is incomplete information on the source of power in a contest, the contestants may divide their lobbying efforts between the potential centers of power, only one of which determines the contests’ winning probabilities. Our analysis focuses on the effect of ambiguity regarding the source of power on the contestants’ aggregate effort in a symmetric, simple lottery contest with two potential centers of power. Specifically, we examine the effects of varying the informativeness of the contestants’ private signals (i.e., the probability that a signal is correct) and the degree of correlation between them. Our benchmark case is the standard Tullock’s model, in which the source of power is known, i.e., the contestants’ signals are perfectly informative. We show that the level of aggregate effort in this case is reached also when the signals are perfectly uninformative. However, in any intermediate case the contestants’ aggregate effort is lower, provided that the signals are not perfectly correlated. In other words, there is a U-shape relationship between the informativeness of the signals and the aggregate effort in the contest. The lowest level of effort is spent when the signals are independent and the probability that a signal is true is about 0.85. In this case, efforts are reduced by about one-fifth in comparison with the benchmark case: from a rent dissipation of 50% to slightly over 40%.     

Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests

Using a public-policy application ofTullock's two-player rent-seeking contest,this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations. In our game these valuationsare the players' payoffs in the twopossible states of nature, namely, theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy. Our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants (theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuationparameters.