Sex differences within the family: Studies of adolescent and parent family interactions

Sex differences in verbal family interactions were investigated in a group of 79 adolescents and parents from normal and psychiatric settings. The analyses were designed to study these differences in both generations, parent and adolescent. Parent and adolescent interactions with one another were observed in a semistructured, revealed-differences family discussion. All of the individual speeches were then scored with our Constraining and Enabling Coding System (CECS). Initial predictions involved both adolescent and parent differences. These hypotheses were only partially confirmed. The strongest findings pertained to parent sex differences, as we found strikingly higher levels of cognitive enabling speeches expressed by fathers and significantly more speeches addressed to fathers. We discuss several alternative interpretations of these findings. Perspectives included in our considerations are direction of effect and influences of task/context upon the expression of family sex differences.This study was supported through a grant from the National Institute of Child and Human Development (NICHD Grant No. R01 HD18684-02) and a Research Scientist Development Award No. 5 K-02-MH-70178 (Dr. Hauser) from the NIMH.Received M.D. from Yale University and Ph.D. from Harvard University (psychology). Currently studying family contexts of adolescent development.Received B.A. from Michigan University. Currently graduate student in organizational behavior, Northwestern University. Current interests are women and work.Received his Ph.D. from Boston University. Research interests are in methodology and statistics.Henry A. Murray Research Center of Radcliffe College. Received Ed. D. from Harvard University (School of Education). Currently studying family coping processes in response to stressful events.Received Ph.D. from Ohio State University (psychology). Current interests in assessing ego development and family systems.Parent-Place, Judge Baker Guidance Center. Received Ph.D. from the University of Miami (clinical psychology). Research interests are in family studies and adolescent development.Received M.D. from the University of Chicago. Currently studying psychological consequences of diabetes mellitus.the Children's Unit of McLean Hospital. Received Diploma Psych. from Freie Universitat, Berlin (clinical psychology), and Ed.D. from Harvard University (School of Education). Currently studying relationships between psychopathology and development among adolescent psychiatric patients.     

Stakes and Welfare in Rent-Seeking Contests

Using a public-policy application ofTullock's two-player rent-seeking contest,this paper focuses on the relationshipbetween the aggregate expected utility ofthe players and their asymmetricvaluations. In our game these valuationsare the players' payoffs in the twopossible states of nature, namely, theapproval and rejection of the proposedpublic policy. Our main result provides thecondition that ensures that the aggregateexpected payoff of the two contestants (theinterest groups that compete on theapproval of the proposed policy) is positively related to the valuationparameters.     

Hizballah in Lebanon ‐ at the crossroads

Hizballah, the Party of God, burst onto the Lebanese scene in a whirlwind of violence at the end of 1983. Since then, it has become a power with considerable clout in the Shi'i community of Lebanon. At the end of the 1980s it reached the height of its strength when it gained control of most parts of the Shi'i concentrations in Lebanon. However, since then, Hizballah has faced a series of challenges which threaten its continued activity, if not its very existence, including the Ta'if agreement, the Middle East peace process and Iran's increasing inability to support Hizballah. In the face of these challenges, Hizballah appears pragmatic, willing, it seems, to abandon its goals, at least for the time being. This, however, raises a key question: Can the organization truly change course and turn away from the ideological commitment and path of violence that have characterized it to date? Or do those aspects indeed define the organization? It is still too early to lay odds on the organization's future, but it seems that it may be in jeopardy.     

Statistical discrimination of liquid gasoline samples from casework

The intention of this study was to differentiate liquid gasoline samples from casework by utilizing multivariate pattern recognition procedures on data from gas chromatography-mass spectrometry. A supervised learning approach was undertaken to achieve this goal employing the methods of principal component analysis (PCA), canonical variate analysis (CVA), orthogonal canonical variate analysis (OCVA), and linear discriminant analysis. The study revealed that the variability in the sample population was sufficient enough to distinguish all the samples from one another knowing their groups a priori. CVA was able to differentiate all samples in the population using only three dimensions, while OCVA required four dimensions. PCA required 10 dimensions of data in order to predict the correct groupings. These results were all cross-validated using the "jackknife" method to confirm the classification functions and compute estimates of error rates. The results of this initial study have helped to develop procedures for the application of multivariate analysis to fire debris casework.     

Lobbying and Concessions: Comparing Nash to Stackelberg Games

We analyze how the standardresults in lobbying theory change when one side has asecond instrument at its disposal. We look at theeffect concessions by one side have on the outcome ina Nash and a Stackelberg game.     

Efforts in two-sided contests

The degree of rent dissipation is studied in extended two-sided contests that involve two types of efforts. While usual contestants expend resources in trying to win the contested prize, potential recipients of the rent-seeking efforts also participate in the contest. This is due to uncertainty regarding the source of power in the contest that induces the bureaucrats to expend resources to increase their share in the rent-seeking efforts by trying to appear as the party controlling the allocation of the prize. We show that the existing theoretical and empirical studies are incomplete and may underestimate the extent of rent dissipation.     

Performance and prize decomposition in contests

This paper focuses on the effect of additive contest decomposition on performance: winning probabilities and efforts of the contestants. Our main result provides a sufficient condition for invariance of contest performance to the decomposition of a contest, when the sum of the possibly differently valued prizes in the segmented contests is equal to the value of the prize in the original grand contest and the relative prizes in the sub-contests are equal for every contestant. It is shown that this condition is satisfied by the commonly used exponential logistic contest success functions. With these functions the contest designer does not have an incentive to split the prize and create additive, segmented sub-contests. We then prove that when the additive contest decomposition is asymmetric, contest decomposition may adversely affect the designer; that it, reduce the total efforts of the contestants.     

The robustness of the optimal weighted majority rule to probability distortion

This study identifies the optimal collective decision rule in a dichotomous symmetric setting, allowing for probabilities distortion as originally assumed by Tversky and Kahneman (Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5(4):297–323, 1992). We show that previous results that identified the weighted majority rule as the optimal one, and did not consider subjective probabilities, are robust to such distortion in the sense that neither the rule nor the weights are changed.     

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

We consider a situation in which two groups contest group-specific public goods. Each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize. Our model can be interpreted as the contestants’ cost of lobbying efforts being non-linear, or the returns to their efforts being decreasing. We show that the level of free-riding depends on the return of the investment. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and/or groups can be added. The question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups?