Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions

In order to decide whether a comprehensive treaty covering all greenhouse gases is the best next step after UNCED, one needs to distinguish among the four questions about the international justice of such international arrangements: (1) What is a fair allocation of the costs of preventing the global warming that is still avoidable?; (2) What is a fair allocation of the costs of coping with the social consequences of the global warming that will not in fact be avoided?; (3) What background allocation of wealth would allow international bargaining (about issues like 1 and 2) to be a fair process?; and (4) What is a fair allocation of emissions of greenhouse gases (over the long-term and during the transition to the long-term allocation)? In answering each question we must specify from whom any transfers should come and to whom any transfers should go. As the grounds for the answers we usually face a choice between fault-based principles and no-fault principles.     

NATIONAL PROJECTS IN CIVILIAN TECHNOLOGY

National projects in civilian technology initiated and implemented by the federal government generally cost in excess o f $1 billion and often extend beyond the political lifetime of a particular presidential administration. The authors explore the consequences of the U.S. political and administrative system on government-sponsored technology development by examining four such national projects: the SST, civilian nuclear power, synfuels, and the supercomputer. They relate the absence of planning and often tortuous course that characterizes these cases to the functioning–for better or worse–of American pluralistic politics.     

SAVINGS AND LOAN FRAUD AS ORGANIZED CRIME: TOWARD A CONCEPTUAL TYPOLOGY OF CORPORATE ILLEGALITY*

This paper proposes a classification scheme for distinguishing “organized crime” and “corporate crime” based not on the occupational position or social status of their perpetrators, but on the motives and methods of the offenses themselves. Using government documents, interviews with FBI investigators and thrift regulators, as well as a variety of secondary sources, it documents patterns of crime in the savings and loan industry and demonstrates that these conspiracies more closely approximate organized crime than corporate crime. Included in the discussion is a brief exploration of the other forms of corporate illegality to which this broader typology can be applied. The paper concludes with a discussion of the theoretical and policy implications of applying the organized crime model to certain forms of white-collar crime and argues that with the proliferation of financial fraud, it is imperative to replace traditional ad hominem assumptions about corporate illegality with more analytically useful distinctions based on the modus operandi.