Resistance to Chronic Violence in Informal Workplaces: The Strategies of Domestic Workers in Brazil (2003–2018)

This article analyses the repertoire of individual strategies utilised by domestic workers to resist routinised workplace violence in the cities of São Paulo and Ilhéus, Brazil. Findings suggest that domestic workers favour two strategies of resistance: exit (quitting work without prior notice) and voice (negotiating workplace conditions). The latter strategy is divided into two subtypes: voice-pleading (appealing to decency) and voice-confrontation (warning and rights-claiming). Voice strategies appear more effective than exit in ameliorating patterns of chronic workplace violence, particularly when they incorporate labour rights claims and when emotional ties exist between workers and employers.     

Forty Years of German Federalism: Past Trends and New Developments

This article traces the major developments in German federalismfrom 1949 to the present. From a system based on a concept of"dual federalism," which was different in important ways fromthe American system, German federalism became somewhat morelike the postwar American cooperative federalism. Criticismof this system in the 1970s led to various reform efforts, whichmade little headway until the 1980s and the formation of a CDU/CSU-FDPcoalition government under Chancellor Helmut Kohl. The "turnabout"promised by this government and carried out to some extent includedplans and policies to strengthen the Länder by some sortingout of functions. These efforts were successful at first, butthe federal government has oriented its policies more towardthe national arena. Financial constraints, the nationalizationof basic rights, technological concerns, and pressures by theEC have led to new tendencies toward intergovernmentalizingand centralizing the relations between the federation and Landgovernments.     

Bureaucratic Migration Politics: German Support for Common EU Policies on Labour Migration

As a macrostructure, this article uses a bureaucratic politics framework to understand the preference formation of the German federal government on liberalising economic migration policies. This allows unpacking the process of preference formation and linking it to a number of causal factors, which, by influencing the costs and benefits distribution of the relevant actors, shape the position of the government. The article argues that the misfit between the existing national regulations for economic migration and European-level policies has to be zero – otherwise the economic and political adaptation costs for the actors involved are too high. A heated national debate on immigration is negatively related to governmental support for such measures, as the political costs of support skyrocket. Conversely, if the decision-making process happens bureaucratically, this helps to attain governmental support, as the political costs of doing so are kept minimal.     

The consents of The Calculus

I study a game where two agents bargain on an agreement to replace the status quo. For their agreement to come into effect, they need the approval of a third agent. The preferences of this third agent is private information, but there is communication among agents. I study this game in the context of international agreements to provide an explanation for involuntary ratification failures. I show that under certain assumptions, the informational deficiency is incurable due to incentives to misrepresent preferences, and that a parliament whose majority is more hawkish than their executive prefers the executive to be risk averse.