Custody decisions in Alabama before and after the abolition of the tender years doctrine

This study investigated the impact of the abolition of the tender years doctrine on custody decisions in divorce cases. This doctrine supported the presumption that the mother is the more suitable parent for young children. In March of 1981, the Supreme Court of the State of Alabama found this doctrine to be unconstitutional. To assess the hypothesis that this ruling had a significant effect on custodyrelated decisions, a sample of court records for divorce cases in an Alabama county was examined as representative of the state on a number of key variables. Overall, no significant differences were found on indicator variables for the comparisons before and after the ruling. There was neither an increase in custody grants to fathers nor an increase in custody requests by fathers.     

Religious influence on parental attitudes toward the use of corporal punishment

Certain Biblical passages if interpreted literally can be understood as advocating the use of corporal punishment in disciplining children. The purpose of this research was to determine if persons affiliated with religious denominations which emphasized a literal belief in the Bible would demonstrate less appropriate attitudes with regard to discipline than their counterparts who were affiliated with religious denominations which do not subscribe to a literal interpretation of the Bible. The sample consisted of 881 persons who were members of denominations classified as literal or nonliteral believers. Statistically significant differences were noted on the Physical Punishment Scale of the Adult Adolescent Parenting Inventory with persons, regardless of gender or their level of education, who were members of churches subscribing to a literal belief in the Bible preferring the use of corporal punishment over alternate methods of discipline as compared to their nonliteral counterparts.     

A risk marker analysis of assaulted wives

In the wife assault literature, a number of risk markers have been identified. Using the data of the female respondents to the National Family Violence Survey (n = 699), a multivariate analysis was performed to examine which risk factors best differentiated between women involved in nonviolent relationships, verbally aggressive relationships, relationships exhibiting minor physical aggression and severely violent relationships. High levels of marital conflict and lower socioeconomic status emerged as the primary predictors of an increased likelihood of wife assault. Research implications are discussed.     

Technology-transfer strategies of DOE's conservation programs

This paper examines the process by which R&D results funded by the Office of Conservation and Renewable Energy (CE) of the US Department of Energy (DOE) have generated commercial applications. It looks at examples of technology-transfer procedures and activitees across three of CE's component offices that correspond to the major energy end-use sectors: transportation, buildings, and industry. On the surface, the conservation programs would appear to have little strategic consistency and, therefore, lack the clear leadership many seek in a technology-transfer program. However, as an alternative to strategic consistency, one may tailor the technology-transfer approach of each program to its unique circumstances. This paper presents case studies of such tailoring, in which the diversity of approaches mirrors the complexity of the energy end-use markets and the private-public interests that must be negotiated to successfully commercialize energy-saving innovations. The paper discusses the lessons learned about the conditions requiring adaptive design and the structures and practices that have been proven effective.     

Underlying patterns in a current economic development model

Public officials may subjectively use a variety of elements, including economic characteristics and political considerations, in their selection of locations and allocation of resources for economic development. Policy capture is a method that determines the impartial weighting of a broad number of elements which influence these decision makers as they operationalize programs. Non-political criteria that may influence the selection of sites for local economic development provide the basis of the analysis conducted in this paper. Public officials at various levels of responsibility assessed the chances of creating jobs for disadvantaged residents (employment success) for a variety of hypothetical areas chosen as an enterprise zone. Their responses give insight into policy decisions. There is a comparison of both individual responses and groups of respondents to the hypothetical data as well as to actual zones that were recently selected. Concluding remarks will discuss these results and the application of this method for enterprise zones and other policy analyses.We wish to acknowledge the extensive helpful suggestions of the editor and two anonymous reviewers.     

Explaining political sophistication

Debates over the political sophistication of mass publics smolder on. The more fundamental question, however, is why people become as politically sophisticated or unsophisticated as they do. This paper develops a nonlinear simultaneous equation model to weigh explanations of three general sorts: the politicalinformation to which people are exposed, theirability to assimilate and organize such information, and theirmotivation to do so. The estimates suggest that interest and intelligence, representing motivation and ability, have major effects, but that education and media exposure, the big informational variables, do not. I consider the reasons and sketch some implications for the sophistication of mass publics, for the study of sophistication and other variables of extent, and for democratic theory.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 9–11, 1987. The data were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Douglas Arnold, John Bolland, Thad Brown, Carol Cassel, Philip Converse, George Kateb, Jan Kmenta, Kathleen Knight, James Kuklinski, Kenneth Langton, Melvin Manis, Diana Owen, Thomas Rochon, Marianne Stewart, Paul Sniderman, James Stimson, and Herbert Weisberg have provided feedback and encouragement. James Gibson relayed his results on the intelligence measures, even as they came off the printer. Mary Lee Luskin helped in many ways. If errors remain, they are mine.     

Protectionist policies as the regulation of international industry

The political feasibility of protectionist policies that regulate international industry derives from the absence of overt collusion among domestic import-competing producers. The regulation of international industry cannot be explicit since governments would thereby be perceived to be approving (or instigating) international collusion. Hence, voluntary export restraints have been popularly presented with a focus on the difficulties confronted by domestic import-competing producers and a de-emphasis on the mutual gains to domestic and foreign producers from monitoring by a foreign government of a restrictive export cartel arrangement. Similarly, trigger-price mechanisms have popularly been explained in terms of the need for anti-dumping measures to preserve fair competition. Likewise, the involuntary export tax derived in the first instance from an administratively validated (but, as demonstrated by Kalt's econometric analysis, contentious) complaint of unfair foreign competition. Voluntary export restraints, trigger-price mechanisms, and involuntary export taxes are however protectionist devices, the beneficiaries of which can transcend national jurisdictions, and which have in common the characteristic that the gains to domestic industry interests derive from the regulation of foreign competitors.A previous version of this paper was presented at a conference on Economics and Power organized by the FWS Institute of Zug and held at Interlaken, Switzerland in July 1988.     

Tollison costs and technological innovation: The case of environmental regulation

This paper departs from the Tullock cost paradigm that views competition for monopoly privilege as a welfare-inimical process that wastefully dissipates preexisting producers' surplus and, occasionally, leads to inefficient increases in costs and counterproductive uses of scarce resources. The potential availability of rent-seeking may bring about the elimination of inefficient regulatory regimes that retard or prevent the introduction of cost-reducing innovations. Air quality management is but one area in which innovation rent-seeking holds promise for concrete welfare gains. Researchers may wish to focus on institutional mechanisms designed to overcome the transactions costs and free rider disincentives to the formation of a coalition to seek innovation rents. An example of such a mechanism might be a joint venture that requires all venture members to engage in lobbying and to contribute to collective research efforts. These unaddressed questions await future research.The authors are grateful for the insightful comments of Gordon Tullock, Robert D. Tollison, Michael T. Marlow and J.R. Clark. The usual caveats apply. The views expressed herein are solely those of the authors and should not be taken to represent the views of their employers.