Does Coup-Proofing Work? Political–Military Relations in Authoritarian Regimes amid the Arab Uprisings

The popular mass uprisings in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) call into question the assumption, widespread prior to the “Arab Spring”, that militaries in these countries were subservient to civilianized and consolidated authoritarian regime incumbents. In most countries militaries have stepped in to suppress uprisings, replace incumbents, or cause civil wars. The analysis of political-military relations explains the immediate outcome of popular mass mobilization in the MENA region and helps re-conceptualize coup-proofing as an important authoritarian survival strategy. Accounting for variation in the degree of officers' loyalty toward incumbents provides an opportunity to test the efficacy of coup-proofing. The article accounts for questions largely ignored in the theoretical literature: which coup-proofing mechanisms work best, and under which circumstances? In a qualitative comparison of Egypt and Syria, the article illustrates that authoritarian regimes have applied fundamentally different coup-proofing strategies. The Syrian regime has engineered integrative strategies to tie officers closer to the incumbent, provoking a greater degree of loyalty during regime crisis than in Egypt where officers were excluded from politics.     

Deficiencies in the Development of European Criminal Law

Criminal law is beginning to outgrow the shoes which were fitted to it by European law. It is seeking to come of age, to play the role in European law previously reserved to commercial law, private law, employment law, and public law in the broadest sense. Economic knowledge and legal-political organisational interests have long grouped around 'European criminal law'; a still vaguely determined object. A desire also exists to make criminal law justiciable in Europe. Thus, the ranks of the contributions to European criminal law are swelling, European associations of lawyers are developing, legal practitioners are launching appeals3 and winning influence within European institutions. These institutions themselves are beginning to accept and to use criminal law as a political option. This article aims to (I) reflect upon the contents of this development, (II) to clarify their tendencies, and (III) to examine the contents of these premised tendencies, in order to (IV) furnish a critical evaluation.