UK OC OK? Interpreting Optimal Classification Scores for the U.K. House of Commons

Iain McLean Nuffield College, Oxford University, Oxford OX1 1NF, United Kingdom. e-mail: iain.mclean{at}nuffield.ox.ac.uk e-mail: spln{at}mail.rochester.edu (corresponding author) Poole's (2000, Non-parametric unfolding of binary choice data.Political Analysis 8:211–37) nonparametric Optimal Classificationprocedure for binary data produces misleading rank orderingswhen applied to the modern House of Commons. With simulationsand qualitative evidence, we show that the problem arises fromthe government-versus-opposition nature of British (Westminster)parliamentary politics and the strategic voting that is entailedtherein. We suggest that political scientists think seriouslyabout strategic voting in legislatures when interpreting resultsfrom such techniques.     

Mental health expertise at prison reception

Although screening has become an established procedure in prison health care, some difficulties persist. In attempts to improve this, many local adaptations have been introduced, but few have been evaluated. We introduced an adaptation – mental health expertise (a Community Psychiatric Nurse, CPN) – into the reception area of a busy remand prison, and compared standard and enhanced assessment procedures over a six-month period. Referrals (n = 67) were significantly more likely to be suitable for onward caseworking by the clinical team after a CPN was introduced. The team showed little evidence of the ‘mission creep’ (where teams operating at a secondary level absorb mental health problems at a primary care level) that has been described elsewhere in the literature. Despite its limitations, this evaluation suggests that prison pathways can be improved by relatively inexpensive local initiatives, and that advancing specific mental health expertise into prison reception areas can enhance existing processes.     

The evolution of regulatory enforcement action in the UK capital markets: a case of 'less is more'?

The first 150 words of the full text of this article appear below. Key points

• Formal enforcement action is a relatively rare occurrencewithin the UK capital markets regulatory framework. This characteristicdistinguishes the UK from the US, where there is a more intensefocus on enforcement, both public and private.
• Several featuresof the UK regulatory system contribute towards a low incidenceof enforcement. Some of these features are embedded in the statutoryframework, but the FSA has played a key role in the developmentof enforcement policy, while the continuing presence of self-regulationin the form of the Combined Code has also played a part.
• Thefocus on risk-based regulation in the UK has been a major influencefor enforcement policy. The move to more principles-based regulationhas also been a factor but one that is more difficult to interpret.If it is correct to assume that principles-based regulationdoes not affect the intensity of regulation, then the effecton the . . . [Full Text of this Article]