Regulatory Risk Management of Psychoactive Substances

Congress and the Drug Enforcement Administration have assigned certain psychoactive substances to one of five schedules, based on assumed or demonstrated abuse potential. Although formidable difficulties exist in assessing the hazards of drug use, some of these assignments do not appear consistent with empirical estimates. This mismatch of assignment and abuse potential -possibly due to "radical" political ideology - obscures significant differences in drug effects, and therefore stifles meaningful public participation in evaluating the benefits, risks, and proper use (if any) of available psychoactive substances.     

Decision Making in Autocratic Regimes: A Poliheuristic Perspective

This paper applies the poliheuristic theory of foreign policy decision making to non-democratic states. Poliheuristic theory asserts that state leaders assign primary importance to their political survival; however, the meaning of "the political" varies dramatically from country to country. Furthermore, the types of actors who hold leaders politically accountable also vary between countries. Consequently, leaders often pursue vastly different means of ensuring their political survival. The author uses the common distinction between single-party, military, and personalist autocracies to show that apparently arbitrary differences in autocratic leaders' political concerns actually vary in systematic and potentially predictable ways. Because this argument is generalized to non-democratic states as a whole, it has important implications for the ways in which democratic states craft their policies toward autocracies.     

A mesolevel comparative approach to maxi and mini strategies of public enterprise reform

Large-scale privatization is an unfamiliar area of public policy. The practice and study of property reforms and privatization needs to include mesolvel phenomena such as laws, regulations, institutions and standard operating procedures. There has been little comparative analysis of privatization programs around the world. The author argues that analysts should compare the most immediately relevant institutional environment of the enterprise. Conceptually, this mesolevel system is situated between the firm and the macroeconomy. This system of action is especially fruitful for cross-national comparisons of privatization programs because it is at this level that privatization strategies are designed. The problem for Eastern Europe and for less-developed countries is lack of experience with the relatively light economic regulation that characterizes industrial countries. Government leaders must also decide how much effort to devote to privatization of state-owned enterprises and how much to fostering private sector investment in new firms. Ernest J. Wilson, III is affiliated with the National Security Council, Washington, D.C.