DIFFERENTIAL ASSOCIATION AND MARIJUANA USE: A CLOSER LOOK AT SUTHERLAND (WITH A LITTLE HELP FROM BECKER)*

Based on Sutherland's differential association theory and Becker's early research on marijuana use, a contingency model estimating the exact probability of getting high on marijuana under various associational and motivational conditions is specified and tested. Data from surveys at two universities fit this model closely. Predicted first-order interactions and nonlinear effects of motivational balance and peer association are statistically significant and generate highly precise estimates of the probability of getting high. These results suggest that linear main-effects models employed in previous research on differential association processes do not adequately reject the complex casual structure of Sutherland's theory. In addition, this study raises serious questions about claims that differential association theory is untestable and has been made outdated by social learning theory.     

Is Chivalry Dead?

An apparent decrease in differences between the sexes in criminal behavior and law enforcement outcomes has been attributed to changes in attitudes toward sex roles and increasing female labor force participation. The research reported here addresses two related questions in this area: (1) Have there been changes over time in sex differences in the disposition of police contacts with juveniles and adults? and (2) Do any observed changes account for increases in the female crime rate? Our analysis of data from 10,723 police contacts in a mid-western city during the period 1948–1976 found a trend toward a diminished sex difference in police dispositions of juvenile and adult misdemeanors and adult felonies. There was no evidence for a similar trend for juvenile status offenses or juvenile felonies. The findings also suggest that part of the apparent increase in female crime may be due to changes in official reactions to female offenders.     

Corporatism and Planning in London in the 1980s

This study confirms the existence of corporatist forms of interest intermediation at the micro level of four local planning authorities in London. In all four boroughs distinctions could be drawn between local business associations and metic, non-local firms. The former displayed most of the institutional characteristics outlined by Schmitter in his original definition of corporatism. In contrast the non-local or metic firms did not exhibit all these institutional characteristics at the level of local government. The conditions under which they bargained with local planning authorities (LPAs) were often influenced by statutory and other requirements handed down from central government. These requirements were themselves often the result of corporatist interest intermediation at the level of the central state. Both local business associations (LBAs) and metic production organizations (MPOs) were required by (LPAs) to implement planning policies. This process has increased in importance during the Thatcher era. Economic decline has made the local planning authorities even more dependent on private organizations for implementation than before. Local LBAs and MPOs were granted privileged access to the planning system. Only the LBAs were granted representational monopolies for their very local areas in this process. MPOs developed representational oligopolies but because they were so few in number they could be in conflict with one another over the rights to develop a particular site. In return for these representational privileges both the LBAs and MPOs were expected to moderate their demands for major departures from the approved local plans. The methods used to intermediate interests to the local planning systems were primarily informal. Although a small number of formal meetings were held each year between external organizations and the LPAs they represented a minority of the contacts between them and representatives of both LBAs and MPOs. Informal bargaining took place in two ways. First, there were issue specific negotiations over particular developments. The second type of contact was long-term, non-issue specific and primarily concerned with network building. Both types of bargaining were relatively secret and involved only the top echelons of the organizations concerned.     

THE POLITICAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

Academic analysis of judicial review is confined largely to juridical commentaries in legal journals. This article, written from an administrator's viewpoint, examines its consequences for the power of government, for administrative behaviour, for constitutional dynamics, and for the scientific study of policy-making. It distinguishes a four-fold effect on administrators, including a substantial element of inhibition, and highlights the uncertainty created by the incremental and inconsistent development of the principles of judicial review. In constitutional terms, while the courts eschew national security and economic policy, they have in other fields explicitly created a process of accountability parallel to that of Parliament, and have resisted statutory attempts to limit their jurisdiction. Analysed in terms of political science, judicial review imposes unrealistic standards of administrative conduct, entrenches the role of pressure groups, and places on public bodies legalistic requirements that they may not be equipped to fulfil. The combination of these pressures, exacerbated by further expansion of the scope of the judicial review, are likely to increase friction between judiciary and government, possibly precipitating a crisis.