Public Approval ofU.S. State Legislatures

The determinants of public approval for state legislatures have not received much attention, but one important finding is that more professionalized legislatures experience lower levels of public support. We argue that this result is an artifact of limited data and problematic model specifications. Analyzing a large national survey sample, we demonstrate that the negative relationship holds primarily for conservatives and to a lesser extent for moderates but not liberals. Additionally, we find that legislative approval in states with term limits and ballot initiatives is no different than in states without these institutions.     

Justice by Other Means: Venue Sorting in Parole Revocation

We consider the factors that shape venue sorting, the process by which a legal case can be handled through different organizational arrangements with distinct procedures, institutional cultures, and sanctioning constraints. The empirical area for our investigation of venue sorting is California's parole revocation system, in which parolees accused of new crimes can be returned to prison by either criminal courts or the parole board. We find that seriousness of the alleged offense partially predicts the venue through which parolees are sanctioned. However, venue sorting is further explained by decision makers' perceptions of parolee threat, as well as concerns about organizational efficiency and legitimacy. We conclude by discussing how these findings may relate to the general phenomenon of venue sorting across a range of legal situations.     

Electoral rules,corruption, inequality and evaluations of democracy

Features of electoral systems have been found to have positive effects on evaluations of democracy. This article proposes that there are larger social forces that must be accounted for in such analyses. Using European Social Survey measures of democratic expectations and the ‘satisfaction with democracy’ item, this study tests for effects of electoral rules on perceptions of democracy. It is found that multipartyism/proportionality and preferential ballot structure appear to correspond with positive evaluations of elections and parties, and with greater satisfaction with how democracy is functioning. However, these relationships dissipate when corruption and income inequality are accounted for. This suggests substantial limits to the capacity of electoral reforms to enhance democratic legitimacy. It also suggests that studies of mass perceptions of democratic performance may over‐estimate effects of electoral rules if country‐level corruption and income inequality are not accounted for.