全文获取类型
收费全文 | 89篇 |
免费 | 4篇 |
专业分类
各国政治 | 17篇 |
世界政治 | 8篇 |
法律 | 43篇 |
政治理论 | 25篇 |
出版年
2017年 | 1篇 |
2016年 | 3篇 |
2015年 | 1篇 |
2014年 | 2篇 |
2013年 | 1篇 |
2012年 | 7篇 |
2011年 | 6篇 |
2010年 | 4篇 |
2009年 | 6篇 |
2008年 | 4篇 |
2007年 | 3篇 |
2006年 | 4篇 |
2005年 | 7篇 |
2004年 | 1篇 |
2003年 | 4篇 |
2002年 | 3篇 |
2001年 | 1篇 |
2000年 | 2篇 |
1999年 | 4篇 |
1996年 | 2篇 |
1995年 | 1篇 |
1993年 | 4篇 |
1992年 | 1篇 |
1991年 | 2篇 |
1989年 | 3篇 |
1988年 | 1篇 |
1987年 | 1篇 |
1986年 | 2篇 |
1981年 | 1篇 |
1980年 | 1篇 |
1979年 | 1篇 |
1978年 | 1篇 |
1977年 | 2篇 |
1975年 | 1篇 |
1971年 | 3篇 |
1967年 | 1篇 |
1965年 | 1篇 |
排序方式: 共有93条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
41.
42.
43.
This paper adds to an accumulating body of research on the risk of delinquency among maltreated children. We use a prospective research design to address the following questions: (1) To what extent are maltreated children at risk of delinquency? (2) Is their rate of delinquency greater than that of two court-aged, nonmaltreated comparison samples: impoverished children and school children in general? (3) What is the effect of maltreatment net of age, race, gender, and family structure? (4) Is type of maltreatment associated with specific types of juvenile offenses? Maltreated children have higher rates of delinquency complaints than nonmaltreated school and impoverished children, but the effects diminish considerably when the demographic and family structure variables are controlled. In the maltreatment-school comparison, an overall maltreatment effect remains for complaints in general and status offenses, but not for property or violent offenses. Maltreated children are significantly different from nonmaltreated poor children for status offenses only. Specific forms of maltreatment are not especially predictive of any offense type. Generally, we conclude that the maltreatment-delinquency relationship has been exaggerated in previous research. 相似文献
44.
Unintended Consequences: Anticipation of General Election Outcomes And Primary Election Divisiveness
JEFFREY LAZARUS 《Legislative Studies Quarterly》2005,30(3):435-461
This article offers the first theory to explain the relationship between primary election divisiveness and general election outcomes that is grounded in candidates' own behavior. Conventional wisdom holds that divisive primaries cause candidates to do poorly in general elections. I show that primary divisiveness does not cause this or any other pattern of general election results. Rather, expectations about general election results cause primaries to be divisive. Non‐incumbents enter races they think they can win, and they think they can win where the incumbent is vulnerable. More candidates enter those races than others, splitting the vote among them. This stampede creates divisive primaries in which incumbents are most likely to do poorly, and challengers well, in the general elections. As a result, divisiveness is associated with (but does not cause) better general election performances among challengers and worse performances among incumbents. In this manner, primary divisiveness is an unintended consequence of behavior directed towards the goal of winning the general election. I tested these propositions using data from major‐party House primaries between 1976 and 1998 and found that (a) candidate expectations of victory determine when and where divisive primary elections occur, (b) those expectations drive the correlation between primary divisiveness and general election results, and (c) primary divisiveness correlates with incumbents doing poorly, and challengers well, in general elections. 相似文献
45.
Presidents have become their parties' chief fund‐raisers and thus have the capacity to further their parties' collective fortunes by imposing a more efficient distribution of campaign resources than might otherwise prevail. In order to succeed, presidents must, first, accurately target their efforts where they will best improve candidates' prospects for winning seats, and second, either directly or indirectly (through signaling to other donors) generate sufficient new resources to affect the election outcome. Analyses of Bill Clinton's extensive fund‐raising efforts during the 1999–2000 election cycle confirm that presidents can indeed use their unmatched fund‐raising ability to help their parties win congressional contests they might otherwise lose. But analysis of the Clinton record also shows that presidential fund‐raising activities may be shaped by other purposes that lead to a distribution of effort that is suboptimal for the party. 相似文献
46.
Parolee deviance has emerged as a central issue in policy debates about crime and punishment in American society as well as in scholarship on “mass incarceration.” Although the prevailing approach to studying parolees conceives of parole violations as outcomes of individual propensities toward criminal behavior (i.e., criminogenic risk), we consider how indicators of individual risk and characteristics of formal social control systems combine to account for reported parole violations. Using data on California parolees, we examine the effects of parolees’ personal characteristics, their criminal histories, and the social organization of supervision on parole violations. We advance the notion of a “supervision regime”—a legal and organizational structure that shapes the detection and reporting of parolee deviance. Three components of a supervision regime are explored: 1) the intensity of supervision, 2) the capacity of the regime to detect parolee deviance, and 3) the tolerance of parole officials for parolee deviance. We find that personal characteristics and offense histories are predictive of parole violations. However, we also find that introducing supervision factors reduces the effects of offense history variables on violation risk, suggesting that the violation risks of serious, violent, and sexual offenders are partially explainable through the heightened supervision to which they are subject. In addition, we find that supervision intensity and tolerance are generally predictive of violation risk. Capacity effects are present but weak. We conclude with a discussion of how the supervision regimes concept illuminates the gap between macro‐ and micro‐analyses of social control. 相似文献
47.
Nearly all studies of pork‐barrel politics in the U.S. Congress focus on the House, biasing our conception of how politics influences federal spending and skewing our attention toward factors that are active in the House. This article highlights differences between the Senate and House in how pork is allocated. We identify four important differences between the House and Senate, generate hypotheses regarding how each difference should influence the distribution of pork projects, and test these hypotheses using data from earmarks in the Appropriations bills passed by the two chambers for fiscal year 2008. The results support three of our four hypotheses, suggesting that senators are driven by different motivations than House members. These results imply that theoretical accounts of pork‐barrel spending need to account for these interchamber differences. Our findings also highlight how studies of legislative behavior, more generally, need to account for important differences in legislative structure and organization. 相似文献
48.
49.
50.