Using Cosponsorship to Estimate Ideal Points

Ideal point estimates based on roll‐call vote results have provided leverage for a variety of theory testing efforts. Recently, scholars have suggested using cosponsorship data as a proxy for roll‐call votes. Conceptually similar to roll‐call votes, cosponsorship data are appealing for a variety of reasons. However, the data‐generating process for cosponsorship is untheorized and little studied. We examine the properties of ideal point estimates from cosponsorship data. We find that the ability to estimate ideal points from cosponsorship data is contingent on the underlying data‐generating process; reliance on such measures requires strong and often unrealistic assumptions.     

The Seriousness of Crime Cross-Culturally:

This study examines the perceptions of the seriousness of offenses: first, by examining perceptions of a wide range of offenses for respondents from two very divergent cultures, the United States and the Middle East, second, by assessing the perceived severity of some 17 sanctions for respondents from these two cultures and finally, by assessing the impact of religiosity on the perceived seriousness of Crime. In addition, both the magnitude estimation and category techniques for measuring the seriousness of crime are utilized and the results from using these two techniques are compared.     

Law Guanxi: MNCs,state actors,and legal reform in China

Since 1978, China has opened itself to foreign direct investment and has undertaken significant legal reform, especially in the area of international commercial arbitration. I analyze the roles that foreign actors and state officials have played in changing Chinese legal institutions such as the Chinese International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and personal relations, or guanxi. 1 ^1. La guanxi is a Chinese expression, meaning ‘to pull strings (to get things done)’. View all notes Foreign investors, attorneys, and non-governmental organizations are helping China to adopt formal commercial arbitral institutions that follow international norms. In that sense, foreign actors are contributing to rule of law in China. Yet, foreign investors also attempt to use guanxi to get around central regulations, thereby contributing to informal legal institutions. The combination of guanxi and formal legal institutions follows a model of path dependent institutional change. I use the terms, ‘layering’ and ‘bricolage’ to elucidate the ways that actors combine existing institutions with new legal forms introduced by foreign investors, attorneys, and NGOs.     

A Multilayered Jurisdictional Patchwork: Immigration Federalism in the United States

This article focuses on the immigration‐related demands currently being placed on local police in the United States and the emergence of what we call a “multilayered jurisdictional patchwork” (MJP) of immigration enforcement. We report results from nationwide surveys of city police chiefs and county sheriffs and intensive fieldwork in three jurisdictions. The enforcement landscape we describe is complicated by the varying and overlapping responsibilities of sheriffs and city police, and by the tendency for sheriffs to maintain closer relationships with federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) authorities. We conclude by reflecting on the implications of the MJP—for immigrants, for their communities, and for the evolving relationship between levels of government in the federal system.     

THE VICTIMIZATION–TERMINATION LINK*

The life histories of drug dealers suggest that victimizations sometimes mark turning points toward the end of criminal careers, which is a criminologically important but neglected empirical connection that we label the “victimization–termination link.” We theorize this link thusly: When serious victimizations occur in the context of crime, a break from the customary provides an opportune situation for adaptation, and when victims have social bonds and agency, when they define the event as the result of their own criminal involvement, and when they find other adaptations unattractive, criminal‐victims are likely to adapt by terminating crime. We illustrate this desistance process with qualitative data obtained through interviews with young, middle‐class drug dealers. We conclude by exploring promising avenues for future work. It takes only a minute to change one's whole life course.     

Public Safety Outcomes of Virginia's Detention Assessment Instrument

The placement of juveniles in secure detention has been the subject of considerable attention recently. For the past several years, Virginia has been engaged in efforts to improve detention practices at both the state and local levels. One important policy and practice change is the implementation of a standardized, structured decision‐making instrument to guide detention decisions by intake officers of the Virginia Department of Juvenile Justice (DJJ). This report will present a brief background on the Detention Assessment Instrument (DAI); an analysis of the performance of the DAI on key public safety outcomes; and an overview of Virginia's participation in the Juvenile Detention Alternatives Initiative (JDAI).     

Slavery,Partisanship, and Procedure in the U.S. House: The Gag Rule, 1836–1845

From the 24th through the 28th Congresses, the House of Representatives operated under versions of a “gag rule” that blocked petitions dealing with abolition and related matters. This article presents the gag rule as not only a historically important window into slavery deliberations in Congress but also a case study in majority party restrictions of minority rights—and in the boundaries that constituency politics can place on majority power. Through analysis of vote choices and voting changes over time, I demonstrate that the gag rule's partisan origins gave way as northern members voted against party and with specific constituency pressures as well as general sectional sentiment. The gag rule shows the power of electoral considerations and constituency in the early U.S. House, and it also illustrates the force that constituency can have over majority procedural maneuvering.