On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning*

Abstract The paper argues that reasoning according to law is an instance of moral reasoning. Several ways of understanding this claim are distinguished. A number of arguments to the effect that because of the internal logic of the law, or the special skills it involves legal reasoning should be seen as immune to moral considerations are rejected. Nevertheless, the paper affirms the relative and limited autonomy of legal reasoning, and the sui generis role of doctrine in it which is manifested in the many cases in which the moral considerations pertaining to the case underdetermine its result.     

Where There's Smoke There's Fire

The heavy, acrid smoke wafted all around. The stench was steady and overpowering. There was no escape.     

A Norms Approach to Jury "Nullification:" Interests, Values, and Scripts

Juries and other lay tribunals are often justified because they leaven the law with community norms. Unfortunately, we do not have a particularly good theory of when and how juries substitute their normative judgments for the law. A first step in developing such a theory is to examine the nature of norms and the way jurors bring normative judgments to their task. In this article I compare and contrast different understandings of norms that currently are in vogue in the social sciences and then use these approaches to develop a more systematic understanding of when juries do and when they do not substitute their normative judgment for that of the law.     

Conspicuous by Its Absence

This year, I’m told, was a bit different:in the interest of not insulting millions of struggling Americans, Santa andhis reindeer touched down very lightly in the United States last month. New Year’sEve,