Distinguishing Between Influences on Brazilian Legislative Behavior

Ideal point estimators hold the promise of identifying multiple dimensions of political disagreement as they are manifested in legislative voting. However, standard ideal point estimates do not distinguish between ideological motivations and voting inducements from parties, coalitions, or the executive. In this article we describe a general approach for hierarchically identifying an ideological dimension using an auxiliary source of data. In the case we consider, we use an anonymous survey of Brazilian legislators to identify party positions on a left‐right ideology dimension. We then use this data to distinguish ideological motivations from other determinants of roll‐call behavior for eight presidential‐legislative periods covering more than 20 years of Brazilian politics. We find that there exists an important nonideological government‐opposition dimension, with the entrance and exit of political parties from the governing coalition appearing as distinct shifts in ideal point on this second dimension. We conjecture that the Brazilian president's control over politically important resources is the source of this dimension of conflict, which has recently become far more important in explaining roll‐call voting than the ideological dimension.     

THE DOG THAT DIDN'T BARK: HOW PUBLIC MANAGERS HANDLE ENVIRONMENTAL SHOCKS

Do negative budgetary shocks reduce performance in public organizations? If so, by how much and in terms of which criteria? Are public managers able to make internal management choices to limit or eliminate the effects of such shocks? These questions are investigated in a set of hundreds of organizations over an 8‐year period. For the most part, budgetary shocks of 10 per cent or more have only limited or no negative impacts on performance in the short term. The most salient policy objective and production for more disadvantaged clientele are especially insulated from shocks. Decisions about internal resource allocation and personnel management can be shown to protect core production while sacrificing more peripheral activities and capital investment. Questions that remain to be investigated include whether short‐term protection comes at the expense of some longer‐term losses, and—ironically—whether effective management under such circumstances weakens over time the political case for adequate budgets.     

A COMPARISON OF TWO PROSECUTION POLICIES IN CASES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: MANDATORY CASE FILING VERSUS FOLLOWING THE VICTIM'S LEAD*

Research Summary This study capitalized on differences in domestic violence prosecution policies between two boroughs of New York City. In Brooklyn, arrest cases generally are filed, but in the Bronx, cases typically are not filed when the victim does not want to proceed. We sampled 272 intimate partner cases declined by the Bronx prosecutor and 211 similar cases filed by the Brooklyn prosecutor. The Brooklyn policy is more costly, and most cases ultimately were dismissed. After 6 months, rearrest rates did not differ significantly between the two boroughs, although victims offered qualified support for the universal filing policy. Policy Implications Prosecutors face conflicting pressures when victims do not support prosecution. Victim empowerment and resource conservation favor declining such cases, but sending a message of zero tolerance favors filing. Our results support an intermediate policy of filing most cases but dropping them sooner to give victims a voice while avoiding heavy investments in cases headed for dismissal.