Truth,Effort, and the Legal Battle

In lawsuits, relative success depends upon two main factors:the true degree of fault, and the efforts invested on eachside. A proposed Litigation Success Function displays thisdependence while satisfying other essential properties. Undertwo different protocols, Nash-Cournot and Stackelberg,solutions are obtained for the litigation efforts,proportionate success, and values of the lawsuit on each side.Outcomes are evaluated in terms of two normative criteria; (i)achieving `justice' (interpreted as equality between Defendantfault and relative Plaintiff success) and (ii) minimizingaggregate litigation cost. Achievement of these aims isdetermined by the decisiveness of litigation effort relativeto true fault.     

Peer effects in private and public schools across countries

Many argue that the composition of a school or classroom‐that is, the characteristics of the students themselves‐affect the educational attainment of an individual student. This influence of the students in a classroom is often referred to as a peer effect. There have been few systematic studies that empirically examine the peer effect in the educational process. In this research, we examine the peer effect with a unique data set that includes individual student achievement scores and comprehensive characteristics of the students' families, teachers, other school characteristics, and peers for five countries. The data allow an examination of peer effects in both private and public schools in all countries. Our analysis indicates that peer effects are a significant determinant of educational achievement; the effects of peers appear to be greater for low‐ability students than for high‐ability students. The finding is robust across countries but not robust across school type. © 2000 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Making a difference? Public perceptions of coalition,single-party,and minority governments

It is often argued that coalition governments are less likely to ‘make a difference’ than single-party governments. Because they are composed of multiple actors who need to agree to policy innovations, and because there are fewer personnel changes between successive coalition governments, coalitions are associated with fewer policy differences. From this it follows that public perceptions that governments should ‘make a difference’ will be weaker under coalition than single-party governments. The same logic applies to minority governments, which require support to pass legislation from opposition parties, and hence are less likely to deliver on their commitments. Using data from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems, this paper tests these hypotheses. The expected effects, albeit small ones, are found for coalition governments, but only in old democracies.