Did the Tax Reform Act of 1986 Improve Compliance? Three Studies of Pre- and Post-TRA Compliance Attitudes*

The Tax Reform Act of 1986 rewrote the federal income tax code, bringing it closer to policy professionals' vision of what constitutes an equitable and efficient income tax. Research on tax compliance suggests the law might have affected taxpayer compliance in three ways: by reducing opportunities to overstate deductions, by changing perceptions of fairness, and by altering tax liabilities. Changes in taxpayer perceptions, attitudes, and noncompliance intentions were examined in three bodies of survey data, each containing pre-and post-reform data from independent samples of the same population. The results show an improved normative climate for taxpayer compliance and point to both the feasibility and the importance of examining the effects of substantive tax policies on taxpayer perceptions, attitudes, and behavioral intentions.     

Identification of the driver in two-rider motorcycle accidents. Inguinal contusion-laceration as an indication of the driver

In motorcycle accidents involving two riders, medicolegal identification of the driver is necessary when one or both riders die. It is particularly important in the latter case, because the survivor almost always insists that he or she was not driving. One characteristic injury that distinguishes the driver from the passenger is inguinal contusion-laceration (accompanied internally by pelvic fracture). This injury, caused by collision of the pelvis with the fuel tank, identifies the driver.     

Entry barriers and evolution of banking systems: Lessons from the 1980s Canadian western bank failures

Abstract: As federal policy‐makers revise and update the Bank Act, any change should be seen in the context of public policy towards financial institutions in Canada. Rather than being condemned to repeat history, both policy‐makers and potential bank entrepreneurs would be well advised to re‐examine the Report of the Inquiry into the Collapse of the ccb and Northland Bank (August 1986), chaired by the Honourable Willard Z. Estey. Public policy for financial institutions faces the challenge of reconciling competing interests. Since 1867, Canada has experienced a nationally controlled banking system that is highly stable (i.e., few bankruptcies) and that has enabled in‐flows of capital needed for national economic development. The Canadian Commercial Bank failure raised a fundamental challenge to the government's policy agenda. When asked what the government's position should be, the three officials recommended the rescue package. All three participants from the political side advised against it. Future policy must learn the lessons from this important and atypical moment in Canadian financial history. Sommaire: Alors que les decisionnaires federaux revoient et mettent à jour la Loi sur les banques, toute modification devrait être envisagée dans le contexte de la politique gouvernementale visant les institutions financières au Canada. Plutôt que d'être condamnés à répéter les mêmes erreurs, les décisionnaires et les banquiers potentiels feraient bien mieux de réexaminer le Rapport de la commission d'enquête sur la faillite de la Banque commerciale du Canada et la Norbanque (août 1986), présidée par l'honorable Willard Z. Estey. La politique gouvernementale concernant les institutions financières a la tâche difficile de réconcilier des intérêts opposés. Depuis 1867, le Canada connaît un système bancaire contrôléà l'échelle nationale qui est très stable, ayant enregistré peu de faillites, et qui a permis des rentrées de fonds nécessaires au développement économique national. La faillite de la BCC a lancé un défi fonda mental au programme de politique gouvernementale. Lorsqu'on leur a demandé quelle devrait être la position du gouvernement, les trois responsables ont recommandé le programme de renflouement. Les trois participants du secteur politique ont conseillé le contraire. Les futurs décisionnaires doivent tirer des leçons de cet évènement important et exceptionnel dans l'histoire financière canadienne.     

General Deterrence and Corporate Environmental Behavior*

This research addresses the assumption that “general deterrence” is an important key to enhanced compliance with regulatory laws. Through a survey of 233 firms in several industries in the United States, we sought to answer the following questions: (1) When severe legal penalties are imposed against a violator of environmental laws, do other companies in the same industry actually learn about such “signal cases”? (2) Does knowing about “signal cases” change firms’ compliance‐related behavior? It was found that only 42 percent of respondents could identify the “signal case,” but 89 percent could identify some enforcement actions against other firms, and 63 percent of firms reported having taken some compliance‐related actions in response to learning about such cases. Overall, it is concluded that because most firms are in compliance already (for a variety of other reasons), this form of “explicit general deterrence” knowledge usually serves not to enhance the perceived threat of legal punishment, but as reassurance that compliance is not foolish and as a reminder to check on the reliability of existing compliance routines.     

Error minimization and deterrence in agency control

In the presented oversight model, in which a regulatory agency may collude with regulatees, a watchdog organization may scrutinize the agency’s decision-making and find evidence speaking for collusive behavior. Found evidence is of a specific, stochastic quality. Courts will overturn the administrative decision when the evidence presented in court exceeds a minimum quality standard set by the political principal. Lowering the quality standard increases the odds of finding evidence of sufficient quality and, hence, leads to increasing collusion deterrence and to a lower probability of acquitting collusive administrators (type I error), but also to a higher probability of convicting an innocent administrator (type II error). It is shown that, when welfare-maximization gives rise to an interior solution, the welfare-maximizing standard of evidence is lower than the one that merely minimizes the costs of legal errors without taking deterrence costs into account, but will imply incomplete deterrence. However, conditions can and will be identified under which both error cost minimization and complete deterrence coincide with welfare-maximization.