The erosion of the administrative state under President Trump: Citizens' pushback against individual and institutional racism

President Trump encouraged bad state actors within the administrative state to contribute to inequities for civilians. We highlight how Trump's actions and rhetoric led to increased individual, institutional, and systemic racism and violence. As a response to this increased violence and rhetoric, we discuss the role civilians (including professional athletes) played in engaging in protests and the 2020 election. Given that more individuals voted in that election cycle, we emphasize the importance for public administration to adapt, evolve, and engage with new actors concerned with administrative action or inaction.     

Ministers,Markets and Missiles: The British Government,the European Economic Community and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 1964–68

Existing accounts of British efforts to achieve a nuclear non-proliferation treaty between 1964 and 1968 largely overlook the later stages of decision making within the Labour government. Scrutiny of previously classified sources reveals that a desire for entry into the European Economic Community had a much larger influence on the content and conduct of British non-proliferation policy than previously suggested. By 1967, Prime Minister Harold Wilson sought a secondary role in treaty negotiations, and left the running to the superpowers. This avoided unnecessary conflict with the countries of the Community, resentful of the Treaty's discriminatory terms, and helped to protect Britain's application to join the EEC. Although this bid was unsuccessful, ambitions for future membership continued to influence non-proliferation policy in 1968. Indeed, a desire for future entry into the EEC helps to explain why Britain became the first nuclear weapon state to ratify the Treaty.     

Distributional effects of dollarisation: the Latin American case

Over the past two years Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala have adopted the US dollar as a legal currency in their countries. Several other Latin American countries, including Argentina, are currently discussing dollarisation. In this policy paper we look at the existing evidence for answers to two basic questions. First, under what general circumstances might dollarisation make sense? Second, are there clearly differentiated winners and losers from dollarisation and, if so, can we identify them, so that policy can take these political economy factors into consideration? Our review of the evidence demonstrates that there are consistent patterns of distributional effects, both positive and negative, from the choice of exchange rate regime. These effects are presently not considered in exchange rate policy decision making, but should be. While the effects are not as pronounced as those from major trade liberalisation agreements, they are significant. Ways to cushion the effects of exchange rate regime choice should be considered in the future by policy makers. Moreover, we find that dollarisation is embedded in the politics of the region. Dollarisation is often sold as a substitute for the deeper institutional reforms needed to improve economic performance and distribution in Latin America.     

Social Movements and Alliance-Building in Latin America

In the midst of an accelerating capitalist crisis, the enthusiasm of many academic commentators for social movements as a form of grassroots political agency capable of successfully resisting a globally rampant capitalism has not abated. This despite the weight of evidence to the contrary, which indicates that in Latin America the interests of farmers and smallholding peasants belonging to these movements are not best served by engaging with center-left parliamentary politics. Case studies of such alliance-building examined here include social movements in Argentina, Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador and Venezuela, and also Mexico, Costa Rica, Peru, Colombia, Chile, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.     

A People's Court: Emotion,Participant Experiences,and the Shaping of Postwar Justice at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, 1946–1948

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East (1946–1948) or Tokyo IMT is overlooked for its contributions to modern international criminal justice. Convened to hold Japanese leaders accountable for conspiring to commit aggression, crimes against peace, crimes against humanity, and war crimes during the Second World War, the IMTFE was both a groundbreaking judicial undertaking and a pioneering multilateral institution. This distinction makes it a unique vehicle for exploring the fundamental challenges of both international justice and organisation. Institutions like the IMTFE are usually viewed through broad geopolitical, legal, and ideological lenses. Although important, these approaches miss a singularly important dimension of multilateralism: the human contingencies that impact international bodies. Using unique participant sources, this article presents an intimate “trial's-eye-view” of how working at the IMTFE affected the emotions, psychology, and temperament of its personnel. Participant responses on these very personal levels had profound consequences on the tribunal's proceedings, findings, and legacy. Other factors shaped justice in Tokyo, but the responses identified here were common, and their impact significant. Ultimately, this paper argues that people and their experiences—as much as anything—produced the outcome of justice in Tokyo.     

How much detail do we need to see? High and very high resolution photography,GAMBIT, and the Manned Orbiting Laboratory

This article examines the requirements for high and very high resolution photography of the USSR and other denied areas during the Cold War. It discusses the partial success of GAMBIT-1 and the much greater success of GAMBIT-3 beginning in 1966 in acquiring the former. The article reviews the development of the Manned Orbiting Laboratory (MOL) in the same period to collect very high resolution photography, the rationale for it, and the major technical and financial problems the program soon experienced. It then describes the debate beginning in 1968 over the value of this imagery considering the MOL’s costs and the growing success of GAMBIT-3, and these and the other factors that led President Richard Nixon to cancel the program the following year.