Food Safety Regulation and the Conflict of Interest: The Case of MeatSafety and E. Coli 0157

The Food Standards Agency (FSA) aims to remove the longstanding conflict of interest between producers and consumers which is thought to lie at the heart of the rising number of food safety problems of recent years, to restore consumer confidence, and to protect public health. This paper sets out firstly to understand what the conflicts are, how they arise and their implications for food safety, and secondly to provide some means of evaluating the proposals for the Food Standards Agency. It does this by examining the current food safety regulatory regime as it relates to e. coli 0157, one of the problems that gave rise to the FSA and an exemplar of the problems of meat safety, and places it in its wider economic context.
The results show that the financial pressures on the food industry were such that food hygiene was largely dependent upon external regulation and enforcement. But the deficiencies in the conception, design and implementation of the Food Safety Act, which was fundamentally deregulatory and privileged producer interests, permitted the food safety problems to grow. The case also, by illustrating how the interests of big business predominate in the formulation of public policy at the expense of the public, reveals how the class nature of the state affects public policy and social relations. Without addressing these issues, the problems they give rise to will remain. While the case is based on experiences in Britain, the problem of food safety and the issues raised have an international significance.     

Catching flies with vinegar: a critique of the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid self-disclosure program

This Article argues that the current approach of the Department of Health and Human Services and the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to enforcement of the Ethics in Patient Referrals Act (the "Stark Law") is unnecessarily punitive and discourages health-care providers from self-disclosing even very minor violations of the Stark Law. This Article suggests a number of specific changes to encourage provider self-disclosure and proposes that CMS create a demonstration project under the authority of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to test the reforms. A demonstration project provides the perfect vehicle to prove that increased self-disclosure protocols for the Stark Law can decrease the government's costs of enforcement, improve program integrity, and encourage providers to deal responsibly with the inevitable minor lapses in compliance that arise in such an enormous government program as Medicare.     

If Brain Scans Really Detected Deception,Who Would Volunteer to be Scanned?

Abstract: Recent neuroimaging studies investigating the neural correlates of deception among healthy people, have raised the possibility that such methods may eventually be applied during legal proceedings. Were this so, who would volunteer to be scanned? We report a “natural experiment” casting some light upon this question. Following broadcast of a television series describing our team’s investigative neuroimaging of deception in 2007, we received unsolicited (public) correspondence for 12 months. Using a customized template to examine this material, three independent assessors unanimously rated 30 of an initial 56 communications as unequivocally constituting requests for a “scan” (to demonstrate their author’s “innocence”). Compared with the rest, these index communications were more likely to originate from incarcerated males, who were also more likely to engage in further correspondence. Hence, in conclusion, if neuroimaging were to become an acceptable means of demonstrating innocence then incarcerated males may well constitute those volunteering for such investigation.